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PREFACE
One of the primary lessons that graduate school taught me was the importance of 
staying anchored in the real world. My faith and my family provided that anchor at times 
when academia threatened to absorb all of my worthwhile efforts. I hope that in the future 
I will be able to stay anchored to the things that are really important, even as I (hopefully) 
achieve success in my chosen career.
Two of the people who changed my perspective of the world during graduate 
school were my brother-in-law, Army Cpt. Dan Enslen (Fantom 6), and my dearly 
departed daughter, Isabel Grace. Here are my thoughts for each of them:
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“The Men Who Go”
Who are these men who willing risk their lives 
For others? Men who called aside to go 
And strive for right and good, respond as men? 
With Faith and Duty, Courage, Pride not Shame. 
They call their own the life-tax on free men.
These common fathers, brothers, husbands, sons, 
Become our Warriors, Heroes, Martyrs, Kings. 
“We rouse to fight—to win the day!” Their cries 
Are heard by all. Which cries are dread to foes 
Who grip and struggle, cursing life with hate.
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“To Isabel”
I love you, but I never knew you.
I have seen the purest snow 
Falling as softly as you ascended.
And I have seen the brightest star 
Filling a void in the heavens.
I have seen you.
I have heard the rolling surf 
Forever changing all it touches.
And I have heard the reckless birds 
Proclaiming the joys of flight.
I have heard you.
I have felt the cooling breeze 
Making the world as soft as velvet.
And I have felt the touch of love 
Giving me a part of myself.
I have felt you.
When I know the wonders of the world, I will know you. 
Until then I love you.
ix





LIST OF TABLES xii




I. TERRORISM ATTITUDES _________________________________ 5
The Definition and Characteristics o f Terrorism _ _ 5
The Psychological Effects o f Terrorism 10
Factors Related to Responses to Terrorism _ _ 14
Attitudes Toward Potential Terrorism 26
II. RISK PERCEPTIONS________________________________________________28
The Psychological Nature o f Risk _ _ 28
Benefits o f Risk Perception Research    31
The Psychometric Paradigm   _   41
Conclusion 46
III. STUDY 1: EVENT FEATURES AND TERRORISM EVENTS____________ 48
Introduction 48
Method 49
Results   50
Discussion 54
x
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER PAGE
IV. STUDY 2: EVENT FEATURES AND POTENTIAL TERRORISM_________ 56
Introduction   __ _    56
Method _   _ _ 57
Results          _ 57
Discussion 59
V. STUDY 3: EVENT FEATURES AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 61 
Introduction _ 6 1
Method _ 63
Results _ _ _  ______
Discussion 81
VI. STUDY 4: RESPONSES TO THREATS AND ATTACKS_________________86
Introduction _ ______ _ __ _ ___ __ 86
Method __ _   87
Results _   _ _ 88
Discussion 93
VII. STUDY 5: INCLUDING SUBJECTIVE EVLAUATIONS _______________ 97
Introduction __    _ _ _ 97
Method   _  99
Results 101
Discussion 114
VIII. CONCLUSIONS   118
Summary o f Basic Findings _ _ _ _ _  _ 118
Implications __ 121
Limitations 128




APPENDIX A. STIMULI FROM STUDY l 143
APPENDIX B. STIMULI FROM STUDY 2 ”  147
APPENDIX C. STIMULI FROM STUDY 3 “  ^ 150
APPENDIX D. MEASURES FROM STUDIES3-5 “ 151
APPENDIX E. STIMULI FROM STUDY 4 “ “ 160
APPENDIX F. STIMULI FROM STUDY 5 “ 161
APPENDIX G. SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS FROM STUDY 5 162
APPENDIX H. IRB APPROVALS 164
XI
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Qualitative Dimensions o f Risk Used in the
Psychometric Paradigm _ _ 42
 Study 1________________________________
Table 2. Sorting Criteria: Past Terrorism Events     51
Table 3. Correlations: Rating Task 54
Study 2
Table 4. Sorting Criteria: Potential Terrorist Attacks 58
Study 3
Table 5. Variables for Studies 3, 4, and 5 66
Table 6. Factor Analysis: Response Variables 69
Table 7. Means: Judgments o f Severity 71
Table 8. Means: Communication 74
Table 9. Means: Estimated Probability 76
Table 10. P 's for Series o f Regressions: Judgments o f Severity 78
Table 11. p 's fo r Series o f Regressions: Communication 79
Table 12. P 's for Series o f Regressions: Estimated Probability 80
 Study 4________________________________
Table 13. Means: Judgments o f Severity _ _ 90
Table 14. Means: Communication 91
Table 15. Means: Estimated Probability 93
xii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Study 5
Table 16. Factor Analyses: Subjective Evaluation _   103
Table 17. Linear Regression: Danger Evaluations 104
Table 18. Means: Judgments o f Severity _ _ _ _   _  105
Table 19. Means: Communication 106
Table 20. Means: Estimated Probability 108
Table 21. Clustered Linear Regression: Judgments o f Severity 111
Table 22. Clustered Linear Regression: Communication __ 112
Table 23. Clustered Linear Regression: Estimated Probability 113
xiii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
Study 1
Figure 1. Multidimensional Scaling Analysis fo r Terrorist Attacks 52
Study 3
Figure 2. Main Effect o f Weapon on Judgments o f Severity 72
Figure 3. Main Effect o f Target on Judgments o f Severity 72
Figure 4. Weapon by Target Interaction on Communication 75
Figure 5. Presence o f Suicide by Target Interaction on Communication 75
Figure 6. Main Effect o f Weapon on Estimated Probability 77
Study 4
Figure 7. Main Effect o f Weapon on Judgments o f Severity 90
Figure 8. Presence o f Suicide by Target Interaction on Communication 92
Figure 9. Main Effect o f Weapon on Estimated Probability 93
Study 5
Figure 10. Weapon by Target Interaction on Judgments o f Severity 105
Figure 11. Main Effect o f Weapon on Communication 107
Figure 12. Weapon by Target Interaction on Estimated Probability 109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT 
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM SCENARIOS:
SITUATIONAL FACTORS, INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS,
AND SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS 
by
Clinton Michael Jenkin 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2006 
The extensive research into responses to terrorism has focused on the effects of 
individual characteristics on reactions to past terrorism events. This literature has largely 
omitted two issues: the impact of terrorism event features, and reactions to possible future 
terrorism events. The first purpose of this dissertation was to account for the effects of 
event features as well as subjective evaluations on responses to terrorism events. The 
second purpose of this dissertation was to compare reactions to past and future terrorism 
scenarios.
A series of actual and hypothetical written scenarios were presented to 
undergraduate psychology students, and various responses measured. A number of 
individual characteristics were also measured. Studies 1 and 2 served to identify type of 
weapon, number of victims, type of target, and level of disruption as specific features of 
terrorism events or threats that are salient to observers. Study 3 through 5 manipulated 
these features to examine their impact on responses. Study 3 found that weapon 
independently affected some responses to terrorism, and affected others in conjunction
xv
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with the type of target. Study 3 also found that some individual characteristics were 
important after controlling for event features. Study 4 found that type of weapon 
interacted with the presence of an actual attack to impact responses to terrorism. Study 5 
incorporated a series of subjective evaluations of each scenario, and found that these 
evaluations were not related to responses after accounting for event features and 
individual characteristics. Differences between Studies 3 and 5 also suggest differing 
responses to threats and attacks.
This dissertation reviews the relevant literature for responses to terrorism and 
perceptions of risk. Also, the results are discussed in relation to previous research, and 
several implications are outlined for emergency preparedness and response agencies. 
Implications for future studies and empirical extensions of this work are also discussed.
xvi
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INTRODUCTION
Most research studies into responses toward terrorism follow a similar pattern. 
First, a terrorism event occurs. Within a few days, or even a few hours, psychologists and 
sociologists begin interviewing the general public, emergency responders, or government 
officials. Further studies are conducted over the next weeks, months, and years. These 
studies deal with large groups of people, reference a specific point in time, and can be 
very effective at helping us understand how—and occasionally why—people respond in a 
specific way to a specific terrorism event.
However, research of this sort has a major limitation: it is tied to a specific act— 
or acts—of terrorism. These researchers can only measure responses to the event in 
question. In methodological terms, the stimulus is set; it is outside the control of the 
researcher. These researchers cannot ascertain how responses might have been different if 
the actual event was different. For example, this constraint dictates that almost all studies 
dealing with terrorism have dealt with terrorist bombings, for the simple reason that those 
are the most common types of attacks. Studies of the nature described above, which 
account for the vast majority of all terrorism response studies, are naturally limited to 
whatever stimuli occur in the real world.
Another limitation that stems from this methodology is that responses are usually 
(but not always) tied to a past event. Most of this research does not take into account how
1
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people may respond to the potential of a terrorism event. Therefore little is known about 
the impact of general or specific threats of terrorism.
This dissertation was designed to address these limitations. Instead of basing 
questions on some past event, it asked for responses to specific scenarios. Some of these 
scenarios were presented as past events, some as future events; some were terrorist 
attacks, and some were only threats of attacks. The primary advantage of this 
methodology was the ability to manipulate specific features of the scenarios, and gauge 
the impact of those manipulations on participant responses. Another important advantage 
of this method was the ability to evaluate participant responses to terrorism events that 
only may occur—as opposed to events that have already occurred. These two 
considerations drove the design and implementation of this project.
This dissertation’s over-arching goal was to fill gaps in the terrorism response 
literature by examining responses to deliberately constructed terrorism scenarios, and by 
accounting for event features, individual characteristics, and subjective evaluations of 
those scenarios. Within this general goal, there were seven specific purposes to the 
following studies: first, to determine which event features were important to responders; 
second, to quantify the impact of changes in those features; third, to identify natural 
groupings among responses to terrorism events; fourth, to identify how these responses 
were related to the other sets of variables; fifth, to examine how individual characteristics 
were related to the other sets of variables; sixth, to identify natural groupings among 
subjective evaluations of terrorism threats; and seventh, to evaluate how these subjective 
evaluations were related to the other sets of variables. The design, hypotheses, and 
analyses used throughout the dissertation were all related to these seven purposes.
2
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This dissertation used four sets of variables. They were terrorism event features, 
responses to the scenarios, participant characteristics, and subjective evaluations of the 
scenarios. The hypotheses and analyses were designed to construe relations within and 
among these sets of variables.
The event features were the objective characteristics of the scenarios. The first 
two studies in the dissertation were used for the first purpose of this dissertation: to 
identify which event features were likely to have an impact on participants. The last three 
studies systematically manipulated these features in order to quantify their impact. Event 
features included the type of weapon, the type of target, the number of victims, whether 
or not the attacker died in the attack, and whether the scenario contained an attack or only 
the threat of an attack. The second purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate what effect 
changes in the event features had on participant responses.
The second set of variables consisted of a number of specific responses to 
terrorism events. These included emotional responses such as fear and anger, cognitive 
appraisals such as seriousness and disruptiveness, and behavioral responses such as 
communication. The final three studies used these same response variables to provide 
measures of how participants rated hypothetical responses to a number of terrorism 
scenarios. The third and fourth purposes of this dissertation were to examine natural 
groupings among these responses, and to determine how they were related to the other 
three sets of variables.
The third set of variables consisted of several individual characteristics of each 
participant. These individual characteristics were gender, political ideology, tolerance for 
terrorism as a form of political expression, fear of terrorism, and perceived risk of
3
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terrorism. Some of these characteristics have been linked to responses to terrorism in 
previous studies; the fifth purpose of this dissertation was to examine how these 
individual characteristics were related to responses to terrorism, and to compare the 
strength of such relations with the impact of the event features.
The final set of variables was a group of subjective evaluations of potential 
terrorism scenarios. These subjective evaluations were only used in the final study, which 
dealt exclusively with future terrorism events. Previous research has found that subjective 
evaluations of hazards have a strong impact on responses to those hazards; however, none 
of those studies dealt specifically with terrorism scenarios. The sixth and seventh 
purposes of this dissertation were to identify groupings among these subjective 
evaluations, and to examine how subjective evaluations of a terrorism threat are related to 
the other variables of interest.
In summary, this dissertation was constructed to investigate how the objective 
features of a terrorism event impact responses to the event, how responses to threats 
differ from responses to attacks, how perceptions of an event are related to these 
responses, and the relative importance of individual characteristics. The hypotheses and 
analyses that follow were designed to construe relationships among and within four sets 
of variables: event features, subjective evaluations, individual characteristics, and 
responses to a terrorism event.
4
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CHAPTER I
TERRORISM ATTITUDES
Terrorism has become a central issue in our society. Since the attacks of 
September 11th, psychologists have researched and debated the definitions, causes, 
effects, and proper responses to terrorism. Most of the research on terrorism attitudes has 
examined responses by victims and society to specific acts of terrorism, such as the 
Oklahoma City bombing, the September 11th attacks, or the anthrax letters that followed. 
However, a complete understanding of public attitudes toward terrorism events must also 
include attitudes toward future terrorist attacks, which have mostly been ignored by 
researchers. The terrorism attitudes literature has also focused on personality issues— 
coping styles, demographic variables, or social support structures—that are related to 
attitudes toward terrorism. Event features have received little attention from terrorism 
attitudes researchers.
The Definition and Characteristics o f Terrorism 
Terrorism is a difficult concept to define. The adage summarizing this difficulty is 
“one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” or some variation of this 
statement. This statement encompasses the idea that terrorism is largely a matter of 
perspective. However, effective research must begin with a working definition of its basic 
concepts. While the debate over whether a specific attack constitutes terrorism may best
5
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be left to political scientists and historians, a working definition of terrorism can be 
outlined for the purpose of examining public attitudes toward this phenomenon. This 
working definition establishes terrorism as a psychological phenomenon.
Carr (2002) summarizes terrorism as warfare against civilians designed to erode 
public support for leaders or policies. This basic definition specifies two conditions: 
civilian targets and a psychological goal. These two conditions are fairly standard in other 
definitions of terrorism. Pfefferbaum (2003) provides a good review of various 
definitions and outlines several common elements: actual or implied violence, fear and 
intimidation, indirect victims, and goals to change attitudes or behaviors.
Terrorism is qualitatively different from other forms of violence in that terrorism 
targets non-combatants and has a non-military objective; other features of terrorism 
include its randomness and the innocence of its victims (Pfefferbaum, 2003). For the 
purpose of this dissertation, terrorism will be defined as an act of violence against civilian 
(non-combatant) targets to effect some change in attitudes.
Based on this definition, two defining characteristics are relevant to the study of 
attitudes toward terrorism. First, terrorism targets civilians with no direct military value. 
From this perspective, the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole would not be considered terrorism 
(though it is often described as terrorism because the perpetrators did not have state 
sponsorship). Ongoing attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan also cannot be 
considered terrorism. While a military observer might consider such attacks to be 
terrorism because of the types of military tactics used to counter them, a civilian observer 
is likely to view such actions as qualitatively different from attacks that directly target 
civilians.
6
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The characteristic of targeting civilians also excludes collateral damage from 
being considered terrorism. Civilian casualties have historically been a part of legitimate 
military actions. To include such operations in a study of public attitudes toward 
terrorism would introduce several confounds, such as the strategic importance or the 
moral legitimacy of the military operation. In order for terrorism attitudes research to be 
focused, it is important to limit terrorist actions to those in which civilians are the primary 
targets. People likely respond very differently to the risk of being collateral damage 
(which is not random, a concept discussed below) than to the risk of being directly 
targeted by violence.
Second, the concept of psychological goals is a defining characteristic for 
developing a consistent definition of terrorism for psychological research. Unlike other 
types of military actions, the goal of terrorism is to change attitudes or behaviors 
(Pfefferbaum, 2003), which include emotions, beliefs, and behaviors. It is this factor that 
distinguishes the World War II factory bombings from true terrorism; those bombings 
were intended to reduce Germany’s access to weapons of war, not to change its citizens’ 
attitudes about the war or their leaders (although other Allied-sponsored programs did 
have this goal). This intent is often difficult to extrapolate, because it requires 
determining the motivation of the perpetrators, who are often dead or in hiding. For 
example, American Airlines Flight 77, which flew into the Pentagon on 9/11, could be 
considered a military strike. The primary target was a valid military objective, and the 
persons on the plane could be considered collateral damage. However, in this case Osama 
Bin Laden clearly indicated afterward that his goal was not to hamper military capability, 
but rather to send a signal to the American people that they were vulnerable. His
7
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motivation, along with the civilian casualties on the plane, places the attack on the 
Pentagon in the same category as the attacks on the World Trade Center. For 
psychologists studying terrorism attitudes, it is important to focus on violence that has 
psychological rather than military goals.
While not part of the definition, the randomness of a terrorist act is a 
psychologically important attribute of terrorism. Randomness distinguishes terrorism 
from most other forms of violence, both military and criminal (Pfefferbaum, 2003). For 
most other types of violence, specific actions can be taken to reduce the threat of 
victimization, such as avoiding certain areas or carrying defensive weapons. It is much 
more difficult to take measures that will effectively reduce the risk of becoming a victim 
of terrorism. Shaw (2003) posited that people respond differently to terrorism than to war 
precisely because terrorism is random. From a behavioral perspective, the 
unpredictability of terrorism makes it a potent psychological threat: terrorism acts as a 
partial reinforcer of anxiety, and partially reinforced behaviors are very resistant to 
extinction (Dougall, Hayward, & Baum, 2005). Randomness is an important 
psychological aspect of terrorism, and is one of the features that make it so intimidating.
Another important psychological attribute of terrorism is its contradictory 
psychological effects. The goal of terrorism is to change attitudes and behaviors in 
general (Pfefferbaum, 2003) and to increase negative attitudes toward specific policies in 
particular (Carr, 2002). Beyond simple attitude change, terrorists endeavor to create 
political change through fear and intimidation (Pfefferbaum, 2003). However, terrorist 
attacks often evoke a sense of outrage and determination in the populations they seek to 
intimidate (Carr, 2002; Lemer, Gonzales, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), which is quite
8
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detrimental to their long-term goals. Once a terrorist event occurs, it often results in 
attitudes of patriotism, group cohesiveness, and support of national leaders and policies 
(Carr, 2002; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). All of these results are 
antithetical to the goals of any terrorist organization.
Herein lies the paradoxical psychological nature of terrorism: it is the terrorist act 
that has not yet happened that fulfills the terrorists’ goals of fear and intimidation. Yet an 
event must occur in order for the public to feel threatened. Therefore terrorists stage an 
attack—which hurts their cause—so that the public will fear a future attack—which helps 
their cause. Shaw (2003) posits that psychological responses to a terrorist event are not 
driven by that event, but rather by the uncertainty it creates for the future. Long (1990) 
notes that a threat can be more useful to a terrorist organization, because once an attack 
has taken place, the organization loses control of the aftermath; as long as the threat is 
present, the terrorists maintains this control. In addition, Browne (2003) clearly 
differentiates the psychological consequences of acute and chronic exposure to terrorism. 
Such a difference is consistent with the idea that true terror is a result of threat (which is 
always present during chronic exposure to violence), not an actual event (as in acute 
exposure). Psychologists need to study responses to future terrorism as a distinct 
phenomenon from responses to specific terrorist events. However, the empirical literature 
dealing with attitudes toward terrorism is almost entirely oriented toward past events.
In summary, because terrorism is a psychological phenomenon in both its motives 
and its consequences, psychologists must be concerned with how people respond to it. 
The political debate about what constitutes terrorism, while important, can be sufficiently 
resolved so that attitude researchers can articulate the boundaries in which to study the
9
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phenomenon empirically. And finally, any study of terrorism attitudes must take into 
account that people respond differently to past and future terrorist incidents, and that 
effective terrorists are motivated to carry out as few attacks as possible while still 
maintaining a believable threat.
The Psychological Effects o f Terrorism 
Researchers have documented behavioral changes in response to terrorism. On the 
business end, after 9/11 there were increases in gun purchases, pet sales, wills, and trust 
accounts (McCauley, 2004), as well as buying protective gear, gambling, renting videos, 
shopping, and watching television (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). There were also increases 
in recreational drug and cigarette use (Miller & Heldring, 2004). Social behaviors 
changed as well, with increases in behaviors such as helping, connecting with others, 
attending religious services, and patriotic activities (Greenberg & Hofschire, 2002; Step, 
Finucane, & Horvath, 2002). Even the U.S. Congress demonstrated changes in behavior 
as they spent much of the next Congressional session dealing directly with issues made 
salient after 9/11 (e.g. guns in commercial airliner cockpits) (Beavin & Looney, 2002). 
These behavioral changes were mostly voluntary in nature, once again illustrating the 
psychological influence of terrorism on personal choices.
Terrorism also has an impact on public thoughts and beliefs about related 
concepts. After 9/11 heroes became more important and relevant to society (Pyszczynski 
et al., 2003) (note the ubiquitous photos of relief workers at Ground Zero, increased 
positive attention to police and firefighters, even a resurgence of comic book heroes in 
movie adaptations). Depending on personal values, people called for either tolerance or 
conformity (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Even as far away as Germany, ideological tensions
10
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between East Germans and West Germans decreased as a new common threat was 
recognized (Noelle-Neumann, 2002). Muldoon (2003) studied groups exposed to long­
term threats of violence and found increases in segregation, homogenous groups, social 
identities, and stereotyping; these were noted after 9/11 as well (Pyszczynski et al.,
2003). There was also a marked increase in reported fear of flying, although this could 
partially be due to more people being willing to let a previous fear of flying keep them on 
the ground (McCauley, 2004).
Psychologists have also studied the emotional impact of terrorism. As would be 
expected, emotional reactions to 9/11 were common, diverse, and severe. Survey 
respondents recalled feeling anxiety, surprise, sadness, fear, interest, anger, and disgust 
(Hoffner et al., 2002; Miller & Heldring, 2004; Step et al., 2002). Interestingly, anxiety 
and fear were not reliably correlated, suggesting two distinct emotional responses 
(Hoffner et al., 2002). There was also an increased demand for mental health services 
(Miller & Heldring, 2004). Even though these emotional reactions were pervasive and 
sometimes overwhelming, past attacks & disasters—such as Three Mile Island, the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, and even 9/11—provide historical anecdotes that panic 
and hysteria are the exceptions rather than the rule (Stout, 2004). However, emotional 
reactions to 9/11 were very strong and fairly long-lasting.
Even the economic impact of terrorism has a strong psychological component. 
The U.S. economy, which had been showing negative trends since the late 1990’s, 
entered a full-scale recession after 9/11. The negative economic indicators were due both 
to direct losses (such as the real estate of the World Trade Center, and the grounding of 
all domestic flights for three days) and indirect losses (e.g. the stock market collapse and
11
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the drop in domestic and international travel). Weidenbaum (2001) estimated the direct 
economic impact at $40 billion and the indirect impact at an additional $60 billion.
Notice that the indirect impact— generally due to psychological factors—was larger than 
the direct economic impact. Much of the economic impact of 9/11 was due to a drop in 
consumer spending. For example, both air travel and hotel bookings were lower 
immediately after 9/11 (McCauley, 2004; Pyszczynski et al., 2003): this change in 
consumer spending habits was attributable to higher anxiety and less confidence in the 
U.S. economy (McCauley, 2004; Weidenbaum, 2001)—a psychological rather than 
physical consequence. The psychological impact of 9/11 did greater economic damage 
than did the physical impact of the attacks.
Empirical research has also examined the effects of terror on children. One robust 
finding is that children’s responses to a stressful situation mirror the adults around them 
(Roger & Schmitt, 2002). If the adults respond with emotional strength, so will the 
children. From a developmental perspective this is not surprising, because a child has no 
context from which to evaluate and respond to an extreme situation. He or she must look 
to authority figures to determine whether the situation even qualifies as extreme, and if 
so, what response is appropriate. There is mixed evidence, however, that children are 
more negatively impacted by extreme stress than are adults. Responses to stress may have 
greater long-term consequences for children because they establish a pattern of 
responding, but some evidence indicates little or no short or long-term psychological 
maladaption to war-related stressors (Shaw, 2003). There may even be habituation; some 
children in more frequently bombed areas in Israel actually report less disturbed sleep 
and dream patterns than do children in less frequently bombed areas, although in other
12
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cases exposure builds up over time and is linked to more psychological problems, not less 
(Shaw, 2003). The effect of terrorism or other extreme stressors on children is diverse 
and not well understood.
In summary, terrorist attacks produce a wide range of effects on behaviors, 
thoughts, and emotions. These effects are long-lasting and widespread, impacting many 
more than just the direct victims. These effects also tend to be related both to the actual 
incident and to some undefined potential incident, although it is difficult if not impossible 
to delineate which effects are which.
Two important points stand out about these reactions and responses to 9/11. First, 
all reactions were observed in indirect victims. These changes occurred in persons who 
were not directly exposed to the attacks, but rather were exposed via relatives, 
acquaintances, and/or the media. The power of terrorism to impact those who are not in 
proximity to the attack is another demonstration of its strong psychological component. 
Second, many of these effects may have been oriented toward future attacks. While it is 
impossible to definitively determine which responses were to potential attacks and which 
were to past attacks, it may be that many observed responses to terrorism were driven by 
the possibility of a future attack. Reactions such as religious activities, disgust, 
stereotyping, that gun sales, will and trust increases, anxiety, or avoiding travel could be 
related to either or both. It is clear that responses to terrorism are oriented toward 
potential terrorist attacks as well as past attacks.
The research outlined in this section illustrates another central point to this 
dissertation: empirical literature has mostly neglected identifying which features of the 
terrorist event are responsible for particular responses or reactions. Because of the
13
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scarcity of domestic terrorist incidents, and the relative homogeneity of the attacks that 
have taken place (mostly bombings and hijackings) it is impossible to identify what it 
was about 9/11 that evoked the observed or reported responses. “Responses to terrorism” 
is a very vague description for such diverse and important reactions, but it is 
unfortunately the state of the science at this time. This dissertation begins addressing the 
issue of which attacks foster which responses.
Factors Related to Responses to Terrorism 
Most psychologists studying responses to terrorism have examined psychological 
distress and the personal factors that are related to it (for a review, see Miller & Heldring,
2004). Most of the following studies used either 9/11 or the Oklahoma City bombing as 
the reference point and investigated the factors related to psychological distress. As 
outlined below, researchers identified age, other demographic variables, various 
personality variables, proximity to the event, experience factors, coping strategies, and 
event related features as the predictors of psychological responses to terrorism events.
This type of terrorism attitudes research is open to several confounding issues. 
One confound is the time frame in which the study was conducted. For example, Snyder 
& Park (2002) used telephone surveys conducted on September 11th, Brown et al. (2002) 
used an internet survey posted on September 12th, and Hoffner et al. (2002) used a paper 
questionnaire administered three weeks after 9/11. Another confound is how the variables 
are measured. For example, Brown et al. measured fear with a composite score of four 
items, whereas Hoffner et al. measured fear with a single item. A third confound is how 
participant groups are operationalized. For example, Bleich, Gelkopf, Melamed, and 
Solomon (2005), Stempel and Hargrove (2002), and Miller and Heldring (2004) all
14
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examined age differences. However, Bleich et al. focused on geriatric samples, and thus 
defined “younger adults” as ages 18-74. Stempel and Hargrove separated adults into ages 
18-34 (younger) and ages 35-54 (older). Miller & Heldring used a middle group of ages 
40-50. The disparate operationalizations of age makes it difficult to compare results. 
These issues must be taken into consideration as multiple studies are evaluated.
Age
As just mentioned several empirical studies have compared reactions of different 
age groups. Despite aforementioned problems in making comparisons between studies, 
there were significant age differences in the strength of the response to terrorism. After 
9/11, young adults reported stronger reactions to the events than did adults over 60 (Ford, 
2004; Miller & Heldring, 2004; Wadsworth, Gudmensen, Raviv, Ahlkvist, McIntosh, 
Kline et al., 2004). Ford (2004) posited that this difference existed because young adults 
are in a developmentally sensitive period, and also because they have a greater risk of 
becoming militarily involved. Stempel and Hargrove (2002) noted that young adults 
reported feeling less safe and more likely to become a victim than did adults over 35. 
However, Bleich et al. (2005) found that adults under 65 were more optimistic about the 
future than adults over 65, and Miller & Heldring reported that reactions were higher in 
40-50 year-olds than in children and older adults. Wadsworth et al. (2004) reported that 
teens and young adults demonstrated greater overall response to 9/11 than did older 
adults, while Lemer et al. (2003) found no difference in perceived risk between teens and 
young adults. Among children, older children are more vulnerable to the stress of a 
terrorist attack (Shaw, 2003). While it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions because
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these researchers defined their variables and age groups differently, terrorism appears to 
impact some age groups more strongly than others.
There are also observed qualitative differences in how different age groups are 
impacted by terrorism. (These differences may account for the quantitative differences 
described above.) Stempel and Hargrove (2002) found that adults over 35 were more 
likely than younger adults to report having made life changes because of the terrorist 
events of 9/11. Bleich et al. (2005) found that older adults (over 65) used more alcohol to 
cope, and “old-old adults” (over 74) had more sleeplessness in response to 9/11. This 
pattern, however, was not distinguishable 19 months after the event. Wadsworth et al. 
(2004) examined both voluntary and involuntary responses to 9/11 and found several 
differences across ages. Adolescents engaged in more concrete activities such as 
fundraising, while young adults reported higher levels of social support and religious 
activities. Also, adolescents and young adults used more secondary coping strategies, 
while older adults used more primary coping strategies (Wadsworth et al., 2004). They 
also found that cognitive restructuring, emotion regulation, and emotional expression 
increased with age, while rumination, wishful thinking, and emotional numbing 
decreased with age, and intrusive thoughts were lowest for young adults (Wadsworth et 
al., 2004). Terrorism seems to have both a quantitatively and qualitatively different 
effects on different age groups.
Other Demographic Variables
Gender was also a consistent predictor of psychological distress after a terrorist 
event. Emotionally, women reported higher levels of sadness (Hoffner et al., 2002), fear 
(Hoffner et al., 2002; Snyder & Park, 2002; Stempel & Hargrove, 2002), and being upset
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(Hoffner et al., 2002), whereas men reported higher levels of anger (Hoffner, et al.,
2002), more impulsive action, and greater emotional numbing (Wadsworth et al., 2004). 
In children, females generally had higher responses to stress (Shaw, 2003). Responses to 
terrorism events differed based on gender.
Ethnicity was also found to be a predictor of reactions to 9/11. Minorities reported 
greater distress symptoms (Hispanics demonstrated greatest distress reactions), but had a 
lower rate of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Miller & Heldring, 2004). Sprang
(2003) noted that being female, minority, or having a lower income or lower education 
level were risk factors associated with psychopathology following a terrorist attack. 
Ethnicity is an important predictor of terrorism responses, and may in fact interact with 
various other demographic variables.
Residential setting was also a significant factor. Stempel & Hargrove compared 
residents of small cities, large cities, suburbs, and rural areas. They found that 
suburbanites had the highest feelings of safeness from terror attacks, followed by 
residents of rural areas and small cities, and lastly by residents of large cities. Various 
demographic variables are related to responses to terrorism.
Personality Variables
Personality variables also play a role in terrorism reactions. Sprang (2003) 
identified the following personality-based risk factors for psychopathology following a 
terrorist event: lower intelligence, memory impairment, personality disorder, and 
dissociation. Generally, people with a previous psychiatric diagnosis reported higher 
levels of stress but lower occurrence of PTSD, perhaps due to ongoing treatment; one 
exception is schizophrenia, which was negatively associated with stress reactions (Miller
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& Heldring, 2004). The immediate subjective appraisal of the situation is also an 
important predictor of psychological distress, specifically among children (Shaw, 2003). 
Developmental differences were also related to reactions to 9/11 (Miller & Heldring,
2004). Other personality variables that were negatively associated with psychological 
stress after a traumatic event were positive affect and finding meaning in the event 
(Miller & Heldring, 2004).
Social Variables
Social variables can be significant predictors of responses to terrorism. For adults, 
a family history of mood disorders or substance abuse was positively associated with 
psychopathology, as is family instability for both adults and children (Miller & Heldring, 
2004; Sprang, 2003). In children, as noted earlier, the reactions of authority figures in 
general, and parents in particular, is indicative of children’s reactions to a terrorist event 
(Shaw, 2003). The use of social coping strategies, which strengthen interpersonal 
connections, were negatively associated with psychological distress (Knowlton, 2004; 
Sprang, 2003). A lack of social support was positively associated with negative reactions 
(Miller & Heldring, 2004). Being around others with shared ideology was related to 
recovery from psychological stress (Shaw, 2003).
The amount and type of interpersonal communication about a terrorist event may 
or may not affect reactions to it. How a person heard about 9/11 was not related to the 
strength of the emotional reaction (Brown et al., 2002), but hearing about it early was 
related to being upset, but not to fear, sadness, or anger (Hoffner et al., 2002). While 
Brown et al. reported that emotional reactions were not related to passing the news on to 
others, Hoffner et al. reported that contacting others about 9/11 was positively associated
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with fear, sadness, and anger. Differences in data collection techniques could account for 
this discrepancy.
Coping Strategies
The method of coping with a terrorist incident has been linked to psychological 
symptoms. Endler and Parker (1990) developed a coping inventory which measures 
coping along task-oriented, emotion-oriented, and avoidance strategies. Sprang (2003) 
used this inventory to see if coping strategy was related to levels of distress among 
indirect victims of the Oklahoma City bombing. She found that those who used 
avoidance coping as their primary coping strategy were less likely to receive formal 
intervention, but reported higher levels of perceived risk. She also found that coping 
strategy accounted for 44.9% of the variance in perceived risk (Sprang, 2003). Knowlton
(2004) posits that the most adaptive post-terror coping strategies were socially oriented, 
because they strengthen interpersonal relationships, but that aspiration toward personal 
growth was an adaptive self-oriented coping strategy. Coping strategy does seem to 
impact reactions to terrorism, and can be particularly valuable resources for mental health 
responders, because coping techniques can be learned and practiced.
Proximity and Experience Variables
Geographical proximity to a terrorism attack is strongly related to distress. While 
strong stress reactions can and do occur in geographically removed areas, they are not as 
strong as in the immediate vicinity (Ford, 2004; Snyder & Park, 2002). After the 
Oklahoma City bombing, residents of Oklahoma City with no direct exposure to the 
attack were distinguishable from a control group in Kentucky based on a series of 
victimization variables (Sprang, 2003). Yet persons not directly exposed to the anthrax
19
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
threat of October 2001 were still psychologically affected (Dougall et al., 2005). As 
indicated above, all of the emotional reactions, behavioral and attitude changes after 9/11 
were observed in persons without direct exposure as well as those directly involved. 
However, geographical proximity is still a robust predictor of the severity of reaction to a 
terrorist incident.
History of exposure also plays a role in reactions, but the literature is 
contradictory, indicating some unknown moderating variable. Previous trauma can be 
related to stronger stress reactions to a new traumatic event (Heldring, 2004). However, 
some research suggests that immunity may build up over time (Jenkins, 1981; Shaw,
2003), while other research indicates that effects of exposure build up over time, leading 
to even more significant reactions (Shaw, 2003; Sprang, 2003). Muldoon (2003) reported 
desensitization in Israeli students during the SCUD missile attacks of the first Gulf War, 
as well as in Israeli bus commuters, where commuting frequency was negatively related 
to anxiety. Muldoon suggests that desensitization occurs only for indirect exposure, and 
not for those directly exposed to an event. More research is needed to empirically identify 
the other factor or factors involved in exposure over time.
Media
Media exposure is another variable that has been studied in relation to reactions to 
terrorism. Media plays a vital role in terrorism. Because a primary goal of terrorism is 
fear and intimidation, media coverage plays a central role in whether or not terrorist 
achieve their psychological objectives (Pfefferbaum, 2003). In fact, the psychological 
effects of terrorism cannot be separated from media coverage of terrorist events (Jenkins, 
1981), because it is primarily through media that terrorists instill fear in their indirect
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victims. Without media coverage, the impact of a terrorist event would be limited to 
people directly involved. The selective nature of media topics (“if it bleeds, it leads”) 
skews the perception of the level of terrorism, causing the public to view future terrorist 
incidents as more likely than is realistic; selective reporting also skews perception of 
government effectiveness, which can drive demand for unwarranted policy changes 
(Jenkins, 1981). Terrorists depend on media reporting to maximize the impact of their 
attacks.
Given the importance of media to the psychological effects of terrorism, it is not 
surprising that media exposure was related to reactions to 9/11. After 9/11 and during the 
anthrax attacks, greater media exposure was linked to higher levels of distress (Dougall et 
al., 2005; Snyder & Park, 2002), and chronic post-tragedy media exposure was linked to 
negative affective outcomes, not positive ones (Greenberg & Hofschire, 2002). However, 
the relationship is not that simple. Brown et al. (2002) found that fear and sympathy were 
positively correlated with television consumption on September 11th, but not with grief. 
Among people who found out about 9/11 via media (as opposed to via interpersonal 
report), respondents reported feeling more upset and angry, but not greater levels of fear 
or sadness (Hoffner et al., 2002). Snyder and Park found that two specific types of media 
messages were linked to higher stress levels: graphic images and advice for staying safe. 
In addition, Greenberg and Hofschire posited that it was not initial media exposure that 
drove emotional outcomes, but rather exposure over time, which would account for how 
media consumption was related to fear and sympathy, but hearing about 9/11 via media 
was not related to fear and sadness. The relation between media and reactions to 
terrorism appear to be fairly complex.
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Stempel and Hargrove (2002) conducted a study that shed some light on media 
effects. Their sample was almost evenly divided on whether media coverage made them 
feel better (31%), worse (33%), or had no effect (27%). It should be noted that in this 
study no direct emotional measurements were taken; participants were simply asked 
about how media coverage affected them. Gender was an important variable. Women 
were more likely to say that the coverage made either a positive or negative difference, 
and men were more likely to say that there was no difference (Stempel & Hargrove,
2002). Type of media was also a significant factor. Those who said that media helped 
them emotionally were more likely to use the traditional media of television, radio, and 
newspapers, while those who reported that media made them feel worse were more likely 
to use the internet (Stempel & Hargrove, 2002). Some demographic variables were also 
relevant. Those with higher education (post-graduate) and higher income (> $80,000) 
were more likely to report that media helped (Stempel & Hargrove, 2002). Finally, those 
who reported that media did not impact them also reported feeling safer, less likely to 
become a victim, and less likely to make life changes (Stempel & Hargrove, 2002). This 
study indicates that the effect of media on reactions to terrorism are quite complex and 
involve many moderators, such as gender, socioeconomic status, and type of media.
Several points must be made about these findings. First, it is difficult to compare 
findings from different studies because of differences in emotion measures, samples, and 
time after 9/11, all of which will impact results. Even replicating a single study would be 
problematic because participants would need to recall their emotional state at a given 
point in time. Second, no causal relationship can even be proposed with these cross- 
sectional designs, because it is just as likely that increased emotional turmoil led people
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to seek out information as it is that being exposed changed their emotional state. In all 
probability there is a cyclical relationship, but longitudinal designs would be needed to 
properly evaluate this relation. Third, any explanation of media exposure effects must 
take into account personal factors such as those discussed above. Finally, as with most 
terrorism attitudes research, a distinction must be made between media reporting of past 
events and potential future events. Such a distinction may account for the contradictory 
findings outlined above, because the researchers did not specify when their participants 
were responding to a previous attack and when they were responding to a potential 
attack.
Event Features
While most research into stress reactions has dealt with personal variables, some 
has looked at event features that are salient to stress reactions. Discussed below, event 
features have included the unexpectedness of the event, number of casualties, severity of 
damage, or the motivation of the attackers. This research generally applies to many types 
of traumatic events, not just terrorism. Carr (2002) theorized that emotional reactions to 
9/11 were similar to Pearl Harbor because both were surprise attacks. Shaw (2003) also 
posited that responses to unexpected events were different than responses to expected 
events. It seems reasonable that people will respond differently to a traumatic event for 
which they have not been able to prepare. Another event factor is severity. Sprang (2003) 
reported that the death rate of an event was a moderator between the event and 
psychological distress, although Shalev, Peri, Canetti, and Schreiber (1996) reported that 
they did not find a link between event severity and development of PTSD. This is not a 
surprising difference because PTSD is qualitatively difference than emotional distress.
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Another factor is culpability. In a review of past research, Sprang (2003) reported 
contradictory findings: some literature found that having a target to blame lead to 
increased psychopathology, while other research found that an identifiable cause was 
linked to decreases in psychopathology. (Perhaps some feature of the causal agent 
determined the type of reaction.) Given these inconsistent results, it is likely that 
personality variables interact with event features to moderate stress reactions and 
psychopathology.
Political science terrorism researchers have identified several characteristics that 
could possibly lead to higher stress reactions among direct and indirect victims, including 
motivation, presence of suicide, and the type of weapon. First, religious motivation may 
impact response to a terrorism event. In many ways, religion is a more defining cultural 
trait than is language or customs, and when two cultures interact, religious differences are 
more often maintained, and even exaggerated, than are secular cultural differences (Pape,
2005). It may be the case that religiously motivated terrorism is viewed as more 
damaging to a culture’s shared value. Cronin (2002) postulates that religious attacks are 
based on faith, which may be more intimidating because it is less understood by the 
victims, and less likely to be overcome by negotiation. Religious motivation may be an 
important consideration for understanding responses to terrorism.
Second, the presence or absence of suicide may impact responses to a terrorism 
event. Suicide attacks denote a tremendous commitment to a particular cause (Pape,
2005), and also may be more lethal, because the attacker has more direct control over the 
event. For both of these reasons, direct and indirect victims may have a greater negative 
reaction to suicide attacks.
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Third, the method of attack may also be related to responses to terrorism. Long 
(1990) states that different types of attacks are perpetrated to accomplish different goals 
against different populations, and are also related to differences in consequence severity. 
For both of these reasons it is probable that method of attack is an important 
consideration for responses to a specific terrorist event.
Fourth, the number of victims should also be important, because the immorality of 
terrorism lies in its creation of innocent victims (Long, 1990). Therefore an attack with 
more victims may be seen as more immoral and evoke greater negative reactions.
Slovic and Bums (2006) conducted a study to examine which event features 
impacted public responses to specific scenarios. They found that the type of weapon 
(explosion versus infectious disease), presence of suicide, motive (fear versus prisoner 
release), and type of victim (government versus civilian) were all predictors of concern 
and perceived risk. Infectious diseases, presence of suicide, and civilian casualties were 
all positively related to risk and concern; interestingly, number of victim were not 
significant predictors (Slovic & Bums, 2006). This study demonstrates that various event 
features of a terrorist attack are important to how people perceive and relate to that attack.
In conclusion, demographic, personality, social, geographical, and experiential 
variables have all been linked to the strength of and/or type of reactions to traumatic 
events like terrorism. The relationship between the features of the event and reactions to 
the event are not so well studied or understood, and these variables may even interact 
with person-centered variables in their relation to stress reactions. The delineation of 
event features that are relevant to attitudes toward terrorism is an important feature of the 
proposed studies.
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Attitudes Toward Potential Terrorism
In the studies outlined above, it is often difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
between reactions to past events and reactions to potential future events. However, some 
empirical work has studied reactions specifically to the general threat of terrorism. Most 
of this work is oriented around the concepts of fear of terrorism and perceived risk of 
terrorism. Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) found that survey respondents feared the severe 
terrorist actions, but perceived higher risk of lesser scale attacks. This difference between 
objects of fear and objects of perceived risk indicate that these are distinct constructs. 
Huddy et al. (2002) found a distinction between personal threat and national threat of 
terrorism; national threat had a stronger effect on perceptions of the national 
consequences of terrorism than did personal threat. Their conclusions are consistent with 
Warr and Ellison's (2000) conclusions that personal and altruistic perceived risk are 
conceptually distinct, and that altruistic perceived risk is a stronger predictor of adaptive 
behaviors than is personal perceived risk. Research into attitudes toward future terrorism 
supports the idea that these attitudes are multifaceted.
Using the framework that fear and perceived risk are distinct concepts, and that 
they can be self-oriented or others-oriented, Jenkin and Cohn (under review) found that 
fear and perceived risk of terrorism were positively correlated with gender, patriotism, 
and a desire for stricter airline security. These results are consistent with other studies 
that have investigated fear and perceived risk of terrorism (Huddy et al., 2002; Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, 2003).
Fear and perceived risk of terrorism are associated with certain political attitudes. 
Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav (2005) found that fear and perceived risk of terrorism
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appeared to have contrasting effects on political attitudes: high levels of fear were 
correlated with reduced support for aggressive responses to terrorism, while high levels 
of perceived threat without fear were correlated with increased support for aggressive 
antiterrorism policies. Lemer et al. (2003) used emotionally laden primes to evoke fear 
from their participants experimentally; they found that participants showed greater 
support for government efforts to combat terrorism. As discussed above, patriotism has 
also been associated with fear and perceived risk of terrorism. Displays of patriotism 
were ubiquitous after 9/11, and this phenomenon has been of interest to psychologists. 
McCauley (2004) suggested that, much like small groups, large groups develop cohesion 
from shared threat. This cohesion is often demonstrated by greater regard for group 
norms as well as greater social sanctioning of deviants (McCauley, 2004). As mentioned 
earlier, Pyszczynski et al. (2003) cited TMT as the mechanism by which fear of terrorism 
led to increases in patriotism.
A proper understanding of responses to terrorism events requires that researchers 
delineate (as much as possible) which responses are oriented toward past acts of terrorism 
and which attitudes are oriented toward future acts of terrorism. At the same time, these 
orientations are often difficult to differentiate, because attitudes toward any future event 
are developed based on previous experience. Research into perceived risk has developed 
a framework with which to examine response to potential events, as well as to examine 
how specific features of those events are related to perceptions and responses. The 
theories and techniques from the risk literature can be adapted to the study of terrorism.
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
RISK PERCEPTIONS
The Psychological Nature o f Risk 
The concept of risk is a psychological one. Risk, as opposed to danger, is a 
socially constructed phenomenon (Slovic, 1999). Riskiness is based on perception rather 
than fact, and this perception is based on qualitative, not quantitative characteristics of 
the hazard being considered (Slovic, 1987). Slovic (1999) argues that risks are made up 
of qualitative attributes like voluntariness or probability. He further posits that no single 
attribute defines the risk of a particular hazard, neither are specific attributes equally 
influential across different hazards (Slovic, 1999). Even when the facts and probabilities 
of a particular hazard are well defined and well known, human judgment is required to 
determine which information is most important to defining the risk of that hazard (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979/2000). These authors found that participants’ ratings of 
risk did not match their own mortality estimates, indicating that other factors must be 
related to risk decisions (Slovic et al., 1979/2000). Whether a risk is considered 
acceptable is also a matter of priorities and values, which are psychological by definition 
(Wandersman & Hallman, 1993). The subjective and perceptual nature of risk makes it 
an important area of study for the psychological sciences.
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Consider the following scenario developed by Mackenzie (quoted in Stout, 2004).
It begins with a threat. A terrorist group declares that unless its demands are 
met within 48 hours, it will release anthrax over San Francisco. Two days later, 
a private plane flies across the Bay, spreading an aerosol cloud that shimmers 
briefly in the sunlight before disappearing.
Scenario one: Thousands are killed in the panic as 2 million people flee the 
city. Another 1.6 million inhale anthrax spores. Antibiotics are rushed in, but 
the hospitals are overwhelmed and not everyone receives treatment. Most of the 
country’s limited stock of anthrax vaccine has already been given to soldiers. 
Emergency crews provide little help as there are only four germ-proof suits in 
the whole city. More than a million of the Bay Area’s 6.5 million residents die.
Scenario two: In the two days before the attack, the citizens seal their doors 
and windows with germ-proof tape. They listen to the radio for instructions, 
their gas masks, drugs, and disinfectants ready. Few panic. When sensors 
around the city confirm that the cloud contains anthrax spores, the hospitals 
receive the appropriate antibiotics and vaccines. Trained emergency teams with 
germ-proof suits and tents set up in the places where automated weather 
analyses show the deadly cloud will drift. With advance preparation and rapid 
response only 100,000 people die (pp. 8-9).
These scenarios demonstrate the complexity of perceived risk regarding 
terrorism. From an objective perspective, Scenario two seems very plausible: if people 
know what is in their best interest, they will do it. However, this attitude ignores several 
key issues about the psychological nature of risk. One such issue is dread (Slovic, 
MacGregor, & Kraus, 1978/2000). If people dread a death from anthrax more than a 
death from being trampled, they may avoid the first even if it means high risk of the 
second. Another issue is trust (Seguin, Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1999); people may or may 
not trust the instructions they receive. They may consider such instructions to be 
ineffective, as many did when President Bush advised people to purchase the same 
supplies mentioned above. A third issue is control (Slovic et al., 1978/2000). People may
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wish to attempt to leave the city anyway, because they perceive that they have more 
control over their exposure or treatment if they evacuate.
Perhaps the best illustration of the subjective nature of risk is the discrepancy 
between expert and lay evaluations of a hazard. When judging the risk of a hazard, 
experts rely much more heavily on mortality estimates and probabilities than do 
laypersons. Slovic et al. (1979/2000) reported that expert judgments of risk corresponded 
to objective statistical data, whereas layperson judgments did not. Slovic (1999) 
accounted for such a discrepancy by concluding that experts view risk as the likelihood of 
actual harm based on mortality estimates, whereas lay perceptions of risk are based on a 
number of qualitative (and subjective) characteristics. Some of the characteristics that 
have been linked to lay perceptions of risk include the voluntariness of exposure, the 
amount of dread associated with the hazard, the extent to which the risk can be 
controlled, the potential for catastrophe, level of uncertainty associated with the hazard, 
and the perceived inequality of risk/benefit distribution (Slovic et al., 1978/2000). It is 
well documented that expert and lay judgments of risk are different, and this difference 
can be traced to qualitative dimensions of risk that are applied to lay judgments but not to 
expert judgments. Ironically, both experts and lay risk assessors tend to be overconfident 
in their judgments (Slovic et al., 1979/2000). The inconsistency between expert and lay 
judgments of risk demonstrates the psychological nature of risk.
This inconsistency also creates a debate about the appropriateness of using expert 
evaluations for policy decisions. In most cases, government and business policy makers 
rely almost exclusively on quantitative risk assessment to guide policies. In many cases 
the involved public fails to accept such assessment. One example is nuclear power
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generation, which has been largely rejected in this country even though it is both safer 
and cleaner than fossil fuel alternatives. Another example is the decrease of property 
values near toxic waste sites despite repeated assurances that the materials have not and 
will not impact local residents. Participants in MacGregor and Slovic (1986) considered 
the standard cost-benefit analysis used by experts to be morally insufficient for evaluating 
and regulating risk, but acceptable as part of a more subjective evaluation process. 
Wandersman and Hallman (1993) agreed that such analysis was insufficient for a number 
of reasons. First, quantitative risk assessments are based on a number of assumptions that 
introduce uncertainty into the process; second, the credibility of the risk assessors may be 
suspect; and third, expert assessment often leaves fails to consider issues that are 
important to the public interest (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993). The unwillingness of 
the public to accept expert risk assessment is a further demonstration of the psychological 
nature of risk.
In conclusion, the concept of risk is socially constructed and psychologically 
oriented. Comparisons of expert and lay judgments of risk illustrate that public 
assessments of risk are tied to qualitative rather than quantitative characteristics of a 
hazard. The relative importance of these qualitative characteristics varies across people or 
across hazards. Risk perception research techniques can identify which characteristics are 
important and when.
Benefits o f Risk Perception Research 
Slovic (1987) uses the Ford Pinto as a case study to illustrate the value of 
understanding risk perception. After producing and selling the Pinto, Ford discovered that 
a defect in the fuel tank could cause the car to catch fire. Ford did a cost-benefit analysis
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and concluded that a recall would be too expensive. If Ford had considered perceived risk 
in the analysis they might have made a different decision (Slovic, 1987). As a result of 
declining to fix the problem via a recall, Ford suffered public relations nightmare that 
cost them much more than a recall would have. Even though the actual fires did not 
create a significant economic problem, the perception that Ford’s product may catch fire 
did. The mere perception of a threat was enough to cause severe problems. The same 
holds true for terrorism. If a terrorist organization provided a credible threat that a nuclear 
bomb would detonate in New York Harbor, the resulting evacuation and general 
atmosphere of the city would cripple the state and perhaps national economy, 
independent of whether the danger was real. Understanding risk perceptions and 
responses to risk is vital for understanding—and ultimately affecting—public responses 
to terrorism.
Risk Perception and Political Attitudes
The study of risk is important in several ways. The first benefit to studying risk is 
that it allows psychologists to better understand political attitudes. Perceptions of risk 
drive public priorities (Renn, 1992). As in the case of the Pinto, or nuclear energy, or 
airline security, the perception of risk, rather than actual danger, drive citizen demands 
for action. This phenomenon is demonstrated in cases of environmental hazards. Public 
perceptions of risk seriously affect management and regulatory organizations’ budgets, 
agendas, and priorities (Slovic, 1999). For policymakers, especially elected policymakers, 
the psychological impact of environmental hazards are just as important as the physical 
impacts (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993). Perceptions of risk are an important 
component of political attitudes.
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Gerber and Neeley (2005) studied how perceived risk of routine hazards was 
related to attitudes about government regulation. They found that increased perceived risk 
of a hazard was positively related to support for regulation of that hazard, even when the 
cost of such regulation was stated to be significant (Gerber & Neeley, 2005). Two other 
variables affected this relationship: issue awareness and trust in the regulators. If 
respondents considered themselves to be ill-informed on an issue, there was no 
relationship between perceived risk and support for regulation (Gerber & Neeley, 2005). 
Trust moderated the relationship between perceived risk and support for regulation; if the 
respondents did not trust the regulators, then they were less likely to support regulation, 
even if perceived risk was high (Gerber & Neeley, 2005). These results also apply to 
terrorism. As cited above, Huddy et al. (2005) found that levels of perceived risk were 
linked to willingness to support aggressive anti-terrorist policies. Studying which features 
of a terrorist hazard impact perceptions of risk allow policymakers to understand which 
terrorist hazards are likely to become important to the public, and why. In our democratic 
society understanding public priorities is essential to developing a politically acceptable 
action plan.
Risk Perception and Lifestyle
The second benefit to studying risk is that researchers can understand how 
perception of risk impacts lifestyles (Renn, 1992). Jenkin and Cohn (under revision) 
documented that perceived risk of terrorism was positively related to adaptive 
behaviors—behaviors related to avoiding risk or minimizing the potential cost of 
exposure. Similar studies have found this relationship to hold true for fear and perceived 
risk of crime as well (Ferraro, 1995). Williams, Singh, and Singh (1994), in a study of
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urban adolescents, found that fear of crime was an important predictor of defensive 
behaviors, such as going out in groups, learning self-defense, carrying spray, or carrying 
a safety whistle. Lavrakas (1982) compared suburban dwellers with urban dwellers, who 
exhibited a greater fear of crime; he found that the urban dwellers restricted their 
behavior more than the subjects living in the suburbs. McDowell (1995) found a positive 
link between fear of crime and gun ownership. Mesch (2000) found that an increase in 
perceived risk was indicative of a decrease in nighttime activities. The behavioral effects 
of perceived risk and fear of crime are well documented, though the research has not 
differentiated behavioral changes related to fear from those related to perceived risk. 
Numerous behavioral changes were also observed after 9/11 (McCauley, 2004; 
Pyszczynski et al., 2003, Weidenbaum, 2001), although it is unclear which—if any—of 
these behavioral changes were actual lifestyle changes. Identifying to what extent 
perceived risk changes behaviors is an important goal of risk researchers.
Risk Amplification and Attenuation
The third benefit to studying risk is that it can clarify the conditions under which 
perceptions of risk either increase or decrease. Risk researchers have developed a 
descriptive mechanism known as risk amplification. Risk amplification is concerned with 
factors, both personal and social, that create either a heightened or lowered sense of risk 
within a society (for a complete treatment of this framework, see Pidgeon, Kasperson, & 
Slovic, 2003). Risk amplification ties reactions to socio-economic processes as well as 
event characteristics (Barnett & Breakwell, 2003). This framework considers issues such 
as the stigma associated with a hazard (Flynn, 2003), assignment of blame (Susarla,
2003), or the social dynamics within a society (Horlick-Jones, Sime, & Pidgeon, 2003) in
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order to understand why a risk might become over or underestimated. Understanding the 
complex interplay between perceptions of risk and social processes is an important 
contribution of risk research, and can inform communication and policy decisions 
regarding risk.
The social amplification of risk framework can be a useful tool for tracing the 
social evolution of attitudes toward terrorism. Consider that several major terrorist attacks 
occurred that involved U.S. citizens before 9/11, such as the two previous World Trade 
Center bombings, the Oklahoma City Bombing, the Marine barracks bombing in 
Lebanon, and the dual U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. However, 
counter-terrorism did not become a national priority until after 9/11. While the damage of 
the 9/11 attacks is one variable, the risk amplification framework provides a mechanism 
for understanding what other social factors were involved in alternately keeping terrorism 
in the background for a time and then thrusting it onto an international center-stage.
Risk Perception and Communication
The fourth benefit to studying risk is that an understanding or risk perceptions is 
vital to developing proper communication and education strategies (Renn, 1992; Slovic,
2004). For any hazard it is important for decision makers and enforcement officials to be 
able to explain a hazard and related course of action to the public. It is also important the 
proper educational initiatives build an accurate and useful public awareness base. Neither 
of these can be accomplish unless communicators understand how risk is defined and 
perceived by the public. For terrorism, communication is particularly important, because 
any major warning must be accompanied by instructions, and those instructions must be 
heeded by the public at large.
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Several factors are known to impact risk perception. The first and most important 
is trust, which has been repeatedly linked to perceived risk. Heldring (2004) identified 
credibility as the first requirement for effective risk communication. Trust in information 
source was found to impact perceived risk of environmental health hazards (Seguin et al., 
1999). In a study that manipulated various features of communications of risk, the 
manipulations were not as important as issues of trust in government and authority 
(Johnson & Slovic, 1995). Trust seems to be more important when the perceiver knows 
little about the hazard; trust was a key factor for opinions about hazard waste disposal, 
but not for opinions about pollution or crime (Gerber & Neeley, 2005). Any 
communication or education initiative that lacks credibility will have minimal effect on 
perceptions of risk. It is vital that agencies responsible for communicating terrorism 
information to the public maintain this trust, or any directions concerning evacuation, 
sheltering, et cetera stand a fair chance of being ignored by the public.
Sjoberg (1999) posited that the issue of trust may go a long way toward 
understanding why risk perceptions seem irrational to experts; if the experts themselves 
are do not have credibility, then disbelieving their assurances is the only rational 
response. Slovic (1999) addresses systemic influences that destroy trust. These influences 
are noticeably present in the arena of terrorism. One, failures are more noticeable than 
successes (Slovic, 1999). This is especially true for the war on terror, because most 
successes cannot be identified or publicized because any information would compromise 
intelligence sources. Two, failures are given greater weight than successes, even if 
salience is equal (Slovic, 1999). One explanation for this may be that failures alter the 
status quo, whereas successes preserve it. Three, once distrust is achieved, it screens
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perceptions and makes failures even more noticeable (Slovic, 1999), because people tend 
to retain information consistent with their attitudes. While trust is an extremely important 
variable in risk communication, it is also a very fragile one.
Specificity is another communication factor that impacts perceptions of risk. Risk 
communications that are not specific are more likely to increase anxiety without 
increasing awareness (Stout, 2004). One example of this is the color-coded alert system 
used by the Department of Homeland Security. For law enforcement officials, this alert 
system is useful and effective. Each level of alert is accompanied by specific instructions 
and procedures. For the general public, however, the system is rightfully criticized for 
being counterproductive, precisely because for a public audience it offers no useful 
information. Heldring (2004) outlined criteria for risk communication to be considered 
useful: credibility, specific information about the risk, specific information about what is 
being done by authorities, specific information about what the audience should do, and 
empathy. In the case of terrorist warnings, unfortunately, such specific information is 
usually unavailable, or cannot be shared with the public. However, risk research provides 
insight into how terrorist warnings should ideally be constructed and relayed.
Bamett and Breakwell (2003) used the 1995 contraceptive pill scare in England as 
a case study for how risk communication drive public perceptions of risk that are 
unwarranted. The pill scare was caused by the release of information that certain oral 
contraceptives were linked to negative health outcomes for the women using them. In this 
case the risk was limited to a small segment of the general population, but thousands of 
women stopped using their birth control, and the health care system was temporarily 
overwhelmed with concerned patients and false alarms. The authors identified four
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factors that contributed to the false sense of risk. The first was that expert opinions 
contradicted each other (Bamett & Breakwell, 2003). When the public is exposed to 
experts that disagree with each other, both sides lose credibility and the public perceives 
the risk to be higher. The second factor was that the media emphasized relative risk rather 
than absolute risk (Bamett & Breakwell, 2003). For example, reporting a 100% increase 
in risk can mask the fact that the risk may still be extremely small. The third factor was 
that the public was informed of the problem before their general practitioners (Bamett & 
Breakwell, 2003). This has to do with specificity; the public knows there is a problem but 
does not have access (through their health care providers) to detailed information about 
what they should do. All three of these factors are often present during a terrorist 
warning, and all three generally act to increase public perception of risk.
These authors also postulated a mechanism by which past risk communications 
influence the response to further risk communications. The series of previous hazard 
notifications (a hazard sequence) impacts the way a hazard is normalized; this 
normalization results in a hazard template—a social heuristic that speeds the processing 
of information related to the hazard (Bamett & Breakwell, 2003). The hazard template is 
the public’s conception of the hazard, and includes such characteristics as the 
organizations responsible, potential victims, causes, and consequences; this template 
provides a common ground for interpersonal communication about the hazard (Bamett & 
Breakwell, 2003). They conclude that in order to understand how people will react to a 
future risk communication, we must first understand how previous communications have 
shaped the audience’s hazard template (Bamett & Breakwell, 2005). According to this 
view, risk communication is a vital component of risk perception, and the two cannot be
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studied independently. This view is consistent with Slovic’s (1999) conception of risk as 
a socially constructed phenomenon. The studies proposed here do not address specific 
factors of the message, such as credibility or specificity, but instead they lay the 
groundwork for how these factors might interact with features of the hazard itself.
Event Features
A fifth benefit to studying risk is to identify event features that influence risk 
perception. Psychological research has identified four event features that influence how 
people judge risk: expected loss, catastrophic potential and other qualitative 
characteristics (these will be discussed in greater detail below), and beliefs about cause 
(Renn, 1992). Risk perception research provides insight into which event or event 
features will be most important for particular hazards. In the case of terrorism, it is useful 
to allow researchers or public officials—given specific information about the 
characteristics of a terrorist threat—to predict how people might react to that threat. 
Personal Factors
Several intra-personal factors have been linked to risk perception. In the health 
psychology literature, three factors have been associated with risk perception: 
demographics, sociopsychological variables (like those discussed above regarding 
responses to terrorism), and structural variables such as experience with the hazard or 
depth of knowledge (Sarafino, 2002). Sjoberg (1999) postulated that certain individuals 
may demonstrate a greater sensitivity to risk, and this possibility deserves empirical 
analysis. Slovic (1999) linked risk judgments to sex (women judge risk to be higher), 
race, (minorities judge risk as higher), political worldview, personal affiliations, 
emotional affect, and trust (as outlined above). However, upon closer inspection, it
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appears that race and sex differences in perceived risk can be tied to the “white male 
effect” (Slovic, 1999). About one-third of white men have much lower risk judgments 
than do everyone else, regardless of sex or race; when these responses are excluded from 
analyses, race and sex differences become non-significant (Slovic, 1999). Examining 
these low risk respondents reveal that they tend to be well-educated, have high 
socioeconomic status, conservative political orientation, and higher trust in authority 
(Slovic, 1999). The white male effect may provide a link to other personal factors that 
influence risk perceptions. Fortunately, intra-personal variables in one area that terrorism 
attitude researchers have acquired a great deal of useful information; however, as 
previously discussed, most of the research failed to differentiate between reactions to past 
events and reactions to potential events. The risk literature provides the empirical 
background to devise and test specific hypotheses regarding terrorism and personal 
variables.
In sum, studying risk perception is beneficial in many ways. It provides insight 
into how risk perception is related to attitudes, and lifestyles. It provides a framework for 
understanding how risk is amplified or attenuated across a culture. It allows for the 
proper development of effective communication and education strategies, and it provides 
an understanding of situational and personal factors associated with risk perception. As 
long as people perceive risk, they will take steps to reduce or eliminate it. It is an 
important contribution of psychology to provide empirical analysis of how and why risk 
is perceived, and what consequences are associated with risk perception.
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The Psychometric Paradigm 
The psychometric paradigm was developed as the research paradigm that 
logically follows the assumption that risk is psychologically determined. The primary 
assumption of the psychometric paradigm is that risk is inherently subjective (Slovic, 
1992). Recall the importance of qualitative hazard characteristics to lay perceptions of 
risk. The psychometric paradigm is based on techniques that collect and analyze 
subjective rating of these qualitative characteristics, including both global (e.g. riskiness, 
etc.) and dimensional (e.g. controllability, familiarity, etc.) evaluations of particular 
hazards (Slovic, 2000). These subjective ratings then form a sort of personality profile for 
each hazard being studied. It is this pattern of qualitative ratings that affect perceptions of 
risk (Slovic, 2004). Psychometric studies have discovered five factors that generally 
account for risk perceptions: qualitative features of the hazard, benefits of the hazard, 
annual mortality rates, catastrophic mortality potential, and relative mortality seriousness 
(Slovic, 2004). For the purposes of the proposed studies, the factor of greatest interest is 
the qualitative features, or personality profile, of the hazard itself. An understanding of 
how these qualitative ratings impact perceptions of risk is a vital step toward 
understanding attitudes toward terrorism.
Dimensions and Factors o f Risk
Psychometric studies have studied numerous dimensions of risk for scores of 
hazards. Dimensions commonly used are listed in Table 1 (from Fischhoff, Slovic, 
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 2000; Johnson & Tversky, 1984; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1980/2000). Obviously, so many dimensions can lead to very cumbersome 
research designs, so most risk studies include the dimensions most applicable to the study
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at hand. For example, a terrorism study may elect to exclude inequitability, because the 
inequity of terrorism risk is not likely to be an issue as it might be for the risks of a toxic 
waste dump or nuclear power plant.
Table 1
Qualitative Dimensions o f Risk Used in the Psychometric Paradigm
Dimension Definition
voluntariness the extent to which exposure to the hazard is 
voluntary
immediacy the extent to which the consequences are 
noticed immediately
knowledge o f exposure the extent to which a person knows if he has 
been exposed
expert knowledge the extent to which experts know about the 
hazard
* controllability the extent to which a victim can control the 
severity of consequences due to exposure
novelty the extent to which the hazard is new to 
society
* catastrophic potential how many fatalities occur at once
* dread the extent to which the effects of exposure are 
dreaded
*severity the extent to which the consequences of 
exposure are severe
* increasing the extent to which the risk is increasing over 
time
Note. Dimensions marked with an asterisk (*) were correlated with 
perceptions of risk (Slovic, et al., 1979/2000; Slovic, et al., 1980/2000).
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Table 1 (con’t)
Qualitative Dimensions o f  Risk Used in the Psychometric Paradigm
Dimension Definition
*preventability the extent to which the hazard is preventable
delayed risk the extent to which the consequences of 
exposure are delayed
* certainly fatal the extent to which exposure will definitely 
cause fatality
* inequitable the extent to which risks and benefits are not 
equally distributed across society
* effects future generations the extent to which the hazard will effect 
future generations
* global catastrophe the extent to which the hazard threatens a 
global catastrophe
*easily reduced the extent to which risk associated with the 
hazard can be easily reduced
*personal impact the extent to which the risk effects the 
respondent personally
observability the extent to which the effects of exposure are 
observable
Note. Dimensions marked with an asterisk (*) were correlated with perceptions of risk 
(Slovic, et al., 1979/2000; Slovic, et al., 1980/2000).
Risk studies have also sought to reduce the number of analyses by reducing these 
qualitative dimensions into factors via factor analysis. This approach has been very 
successful and has lead to robust research findings. Two factors have been consistently 
(though not exclusively) identified—dread risk, which is associated with lack of control,
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dreaded consequences, catastrophic potential, inequitable distribution, increasing risk, 
and fatal consequences; and unknown risk, which is associated with unobservability, 
novelty, unknown exposure, unknown to science, and delayed consequences (Slovic,
1992; Slovic, 2004). Two other factors have also been identified in individual studies: 
number of people exposed (Slovic et al., 1980/2000), and severity of consequences 
(Fischhoff et al., 2000). The consistent finding, however, is that the factor dread risk has 
been the best predictor of the overall perceived risk of a hazard (Fischhoff et al., 2000; 
Slovic, 1992, Slovic, 2004; Slovic et al., 1979/2000; Slovic et al., 1980/2000). Identifying 
the importance of dread and its impact on perceptions of risk is a valuable contribution of 
risk research in general and the psychometric paradigm in particular.
The identification of two primary factors that qualitatively described hazards has 
allowed risk researchers to map out a number of hazards in two-factor space. Such 
taxonomy is useful for two purposes. The first value is that it accounts for differences in 
risk perceptions across hazards (Slovic, 1987). In fact, the perceived risk of a hazard is 
related to its position in the two-factor space (Slovic, 1992, Slovic, 2004; Slovic et al., 
1979/2000; Slovic et al., 1980/2000). The second value is that it accounts for 
discrepancies between lay and expert estimates of risk (Slovic, 1987). While lay 
perceptions of risk are consistently tied to dread risk, expert ratings are not (Slovic,
1992).
In sum, the psychometric paradigm is research methodology derived from the 
assumption that risk is subjective and that qualitative features of hazards will be linked to 
perceptions of risk. Numerous qualitative features (dimensions) have been studied; some 
are consistently related to risk and some are not. One of the most relevant features to
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terrorism hazards is signal value. These dimensions can also be reduced to underlying 
factors—dread and unknown risk. These two factors allow the hazards to be mapped on a 
Cartesian plane. The location of each hazard is useful for understanding how it is 
perceived. This paradigm provides a promising set of techniques with which to better 
understand attitudes toward terrorism.
The Psychometric Paradigm and Specific Hazards
While most psychometric studies examine many different hazards, the paradigm 
can be adapted to accommodate an in-depth study of one hazard. Single hazard domains 
have been studied using the psychometric paradigm, and they too can be represented in 
two-factor space, where position is predictive of perceived risk (Slovic, 1987). Slovic 
(1992) examined attitudes toward unwanted land uses, and also provided several 
examples hazards that have been studied using psychometric techniques to specific 
hazards, such as automobile structural defect (Slovic, MacGregor, & Kraus, 1987), 
railroad accidents (Kraus & Slovic, 1988), automobile subsystem failures (MacGregor & 
Slovic, 1989), and medicines (Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, Letzel, & Malmfors, 1989). While in 
these studies risk dimensions were reducible into factors, the factors did not always 
match those found in multiple-hazard studies. For example, the factors that were 
observed for automobile subsystem defects were “foreseeable” and “severe, 
uncontrollable damage” (Slovic et al., 1987). Given the nature of the hazard, these factors 
are more logical than dread risk and unknown risk. The psychometric paradigm has been 
successfully applied to single hazards. Slovic (1992) cautioned against representing 
complex events as a single homogenous data point. While terrorism has been included as
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a single hazard in past psychometric studies, the complexity and relevance of terrorism in 
today’s society merits an empirical exploration of terrorism as the entire hazard space.
Conclusion
The study of attitudes toward terrorism is a vital psychological endeavor in the 
post-9/11 world. Fortunately, much work has been done, and the resulting literature 
provides a great deal of insight into how people respond to terrorism and other threats of 
violence (e.g. Brown et al, 2002; Miller & Heldring, 2004; Snyder & Park, 2002; Sprang,
2003). Unfortunately, most of the empirical work has focused on responses to past 
terrorist incidents, and have looked mainly at personal factors that are related to such 
response (e.g. Ford, 2004; Grothberg, 2004; Miller & Heldring, 2004; Muldoon, 2003). 
However, because each terrorist attack evokes anger and resolve, terrorists primarily 
achieve their goal of fear and intimidation through the threat of future attacks rather than 
the occurrence of previous ones. From a psychological perspective, the terrorism that has 
not yet happened is as important as the terrorism that just happened.
Terrorism’s future-orientation highlights the importance of understanding how 
people respond to threats as well as to actual incidents. The best psychological approach 
to such attitudes is through the field of risk. Risk is based on judgments, and thus is 
psychological in nature. The psychological study of risk provides insight into how people 
view various threats, and therefore informs predictions about how people will react to the 
threat of terrorism. The psychometric paradigm specifically offers a valuable 
methodology to explore which features of a terrorist incident drive psychological 
perceptions and reactions to that incident. Both Sjoberg (2004) and Slovic (2002) suggest 
that risk perception methodology should be used to study attitudes toward terrorism.
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Terrorism has become a driving cultural and political force. More specifically, the 
threat of terrorism has become a driving cultural and political force. Credible threat is the 
currency of terrorist organizations. An organization that cannot threaten and be taken 
seriously has no power to change attitudes and behaviors. Because the power of terrorism 
comes from such threats, controlling risk has taken on national significance, with an 
entire cabinet-level department, as well as local and state-wide partner agencies, devoted 
to managing (and hopefully reducing) risk. However, these agencies cannot properly 
reduce risk without first understanding how risk is perceived. Because of the United 
States’ political structure, public attitudes toward terrorism occupy a pre-eminent place in 
establishing government priorities. It is essential that psychologists develop empirically 
tested knowledge about how these attitudes are constructed, how they change across time, 
and how they impact behavior. The literature reviewed here provides essential progress 
toward understanding terrorism attitudes, and outlines a promising framework for 
continuing that progress.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 1: EVENT FEATURES AND TERRORISM EVENTS
Introduction
As discussed in the introduction, this dissertation was designed to examine how 
event features—the objective characteristics of an act of terrorism, impact responses. A 
list of several dozen such features could easily be constructed; however, methodological 
considerations dictate that a small subset of important features must be selected from the 
set of all possible features. Unfortunately, previous literature offered no empirical insight 
into which features should be manipulated. Study 1 was designed to address this concern. 
Study 1 met the first purpose of this dissertation: to identify which event features are of 
greatest import for terrorism. Once a small group of event features could be empirically 
identified as the most salient, systematic manipulations could be designed for further 
studies.
For Study 1, participants grouped attacks into subjective categories, and also rated 
the same attacks based on how serious they thought the each attacks was. The criteria 
used to group the attacks, the number of times attacks were placed in the same category, 
and the seriousness rating of each attack was the variable of interest. In addition, 
objective characteristics of each attack were examined to determine which ones, if any, 
were related to subjective perceptions. Because of the exploratory nature of this study, no
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specific hypotheses were tested. In fact, no past studies offered any predictions regarding 
which event features would be most salient.
Method
Participants
One hundred fifteen University of New Hampshire undergraduates participated in 
this study (21 males, 93 females), and were randomly assigned either to a categorization 
task (n = 39) or a rating task (n =  76). Ages ranged from 18-23 (M = 19.9, SD = 1.0). 
Participants were Caucasian (n = 103), Hispanic (n = 5), Asian (n = 3), and African 
American (n = 2). In response to religious identification, participants indicated Catholic 
(n = 51), Protestant (n -  12), “Christian, non-denominational” (n -  10), Muslim (n = 1), 
“none” (n = 30), and “other” (n = 10). One hundred nine indicated that they were U.S. 
citizens, and most lived in the northeast United States (n = 113). Participants received 
partial course credit for their participation.
Materials
Forty-nine terrorist attacks were selected from the U.S. State Department’s 
International Information Program’s (2001) list of terrorist attacks (Appendix A). Low- 
publicity incidents were selected, and all incidents were changed to exclude specific 
names and dates. However, titles (e.g. Ambassador) and countries were retained, because 
target and location were considered to be possible salient features. Each attack was 
presented on an index card. Participants in the categorization task were given a stack of 
all 49 cards, and were also given a blank card on which to write brief descriptions of each 
category.
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Participants in the rating task were presented with each attack and asked to assign 
a rating of 0-100 based on seriousness, where 0 indicate “not at all serious,” and 100 
indicated “extremely serious.” Participants were given one additional attack as a 
reference point, and were told that this reference attack had a value of 50.
Procedure
Categorization task. Participants for the categorization task participated in groups 
of 5. Upon arrival, participants were asked to sign an informed consent sheet, and then 
were presented with instructions and the index cards. Each participant received an entire 
stack of cards. They were instructed to divide their stack into 3-7 categories. The exact 
number of categories, and the composition of each category, was explicitly left to their 
discretion. They were asked only to describe each category briefly on their blank answer 
card. Upon completion of the task, participants were given a debriefing and dismissed.
Rating task. Participants in the rating task signed up to participate in groups of 20 
with no knowledge of the topic or procedures of the study. Upon arrival, each participant 
filled out an informed consent sheet, and was then instructed to rate each attack. Upon 
completion of the survey, participants were given a debriefing and dismissed.
Results
Frequency Analysis
The criteria used in the categorization task to divide the cards are listed in Table 
2. It should be noted that most participants used multiple criteria to divide their stacks of 
cards, so the totals exceed the number of participants. The common criterion was type of 
attack, which was used in some way by more than half the participants. Other common
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criteria were suicide vs. non-suicide (n = 11), number of victims {n -  11), and type of 
target (n = 10).
Table 2
Sorting Criteria: Past Terrorism Events (Study 1)
Sorting Criteria Frequency % of Participants 
(N=39)
Type of Attack 23 59.0
Suicide 11 28.2
Number of victims 11 28.2
Type of target 9 23.1
Type of victim 6 15.4
Motivation 5 12.8
Known perps 5 12.8
Victim nationality 4 10.3
Geographic location 2 5.1
Ratio dead/injured 2 5.1
Survivors 2 5.1
Perpetrators caught 1 2.6
Success of attack 1 2.6
Amount of planning 1 2.6
Amount of information given 1 2.6
Multidimensional Scaling
A co-occurrence matrix was devised in which each attack was paired with every 
other attack. A number was assigned to each pair—the number of times they were placed 
in different categories by a participant. These scores were converted into a distance 
measure (a higher score represented a greater distance between attacks) and entered into a 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) analysis. MDS is an iterative process by which a group 
of stimuli are arranged and rearranged until their spatial distances in Euclidean space
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correspond to the observed distances. (Non-Euclidean spatial representations are also 
possible, but were not used for these data.) Two dimensions were specified for this 
analysis. The two-dimensional solution is presented in Figure 1. As is evident from this 
figure, the attacks were grouped based on their type, which is a direct result of type of 
attack being used as the most common grouping variable.
Figure 1
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Dimension 1
Note. 1. General Bombings; 2. Suicide Bombings; 3. Kidnappings; 4. Shootings; 
5. Rockets/Grenades
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However, of greatest interest here are each attack’s dimensional coordinates. 
These coordinates were examined to see if either dimension could be related to some 
other characteristic of the attacks. All 49 attacks were assigned a score by the researcher 
based on eleven yes or no questions. These questions are listed in Table 3. If the answer 
was “yes,” the attack was given a score of 1. If the answer was “no,” the attack was given 
a score of 0. These binary scores were then correlated with each of the dimensions from 
the MDS analysis. Whether the attacks targeted a specific person, r(48) = .47, p. = .001, 
and whether the perpetrators were caught, r(48) = .36, p. = .012, were both significantly 
correlated with dimension 1. No correlations with dimension 2 were significant. From 
these correlations, and the qualitative assessment of the location of each type of attack in 
the two-dimensional space, dimension 1 appears to be related to the randomness of the 
attack, with targeted attacks located higher on the number line. A qualitative examination 
of dimension 2 suggests that perhaps it is related to the perpetrator having direct contact 
with the victim. The attacks above the abscissa, (groups 2 and 3, suicide bombings and 
kidnappings respectively) require personal contact between the attacker and the victim. 
Seriousness Ratings
The binary coding from the eleven yes/no questions from the previous task were 
correlated with ratings of seriousness. These correlations are also presented in Table 3. 
Whether or not victims died, and whether or not the specific number of casualties was 
mentioned were both positively correlated with seriousness, as well as whether the attack 
was religiously motivated. Political motivation, specific mention of a terrorist group, and 
specific target were all negatively correlated with seriousness. It should also be noted that
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dimension 1, which seemed to be related to the randomness of the attack, was also 
negatively correlated with seriousness.
Table 3
Correlations: Rating Task (Study 1)
Seriousness Dimension 1
Question r r
Were U.S. citizens involved? -.24 .16
Did any of the victims die? g7 *** -.23
Did the summary specify the number of killed 52 * * * -.19and/or injured?
Were the perpetrators known? -.14 .36 *
Were the perps caught? .13 -.06
Did the perps die? .12 -.19
Was it religiously motivated? .32 * .04
Was it politically motivated? -.35 * .14
Was a specific terrorist organization mentioned? -.36 * .03
Did the attack target specific persons? -.32 * .47 **
Note: N  = 49; seriousness was correlated with Dimension 1, r = -.29* *p < .05;
* * p <  .01; * * * p <  .001
Discussion
Several general conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, type of attack 
was the most salient feature of a past terrorist incident. The type of attack was used by 
59% of participants to divide attacks into categories. Characteristics that also seem 
important from the categorization results are whether or not the attack was a suicide 
attack, how many people were killed or injured, and the type of target being attacked. But 
the type of attack was used much more often than any other characteristic to compose 
categories of attacks.
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Second, randomness was an important variable in how terrorist attacks were 
grouped. The MDS spatial representation seemed to be related to whether the attacks 
were random or targeted, and ratings of seriousness were also correlated with this factor. 
Whether the perpetrators were known was also related to the MDS analysis, and could 
arguably be a measure of how random an attack appears to an observer. These results 
indicate that targeted attacks are seen as less serious than random attacks, and that 
random types of attacks may be seen as more similar to each other than targeted attacks.
Third, one significant correlation that deserves further attention is the positive 
correlation between religious motivation and seriousness. This correlation can be 
accounted for in several ways. Perhaps the attacks of 9/11 produced a schema of 
terrorism in which religious terrorism is more serious. Perhaps politically motivated 
terrorism (such as is common in Israel) is viewed as justifiable, whereas religiously 
motivated terrorism is not. Perhaps the religiously motivated attacks in the sample were 
actually more serious in terms of how many people were involved or the scale of the 
violence.
Study 3 will manipulate some of these event features to determine how they 
impact responses to terrorism events. However, one more pilot study was completed first, 
to determine the salient features of potential terrorism.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 2: EVENT FEATURES AND POTENTIAL TERRORISM
Introduction
One of the distinctions that drove the design and implementation of this 
dissertation was the difference between responses to past attacks and responses to future 
attacks. While Study 1 successfully identified a group of salient features for past attacks, 
a separate study was needed to identify the salient features of potential attacks. The 
primary reason that the findings from Study 1 could not be applied to potential terrorism 
is that much less is known about events that have not yet happened. If an event has not 
occurred, then the number of victims or the death of the attacker cannot be known. The 
salient features of terrorist threats must be determined separately from the salient features 
of terrorist attacks. Study 2 fills this gap. It further addressed the first purpose of this 
dissertation: narrowing down the list of event features to be manipulated in future studies.
The purpose of Study 2 was to determine which event features were most salient 
to observers for potential terrorist attacks. Once these features were identified, a new set 
of threats were fabricated in which the relevant features are known quantities. Salient 
features were identified by examining the criteria used to sort a group of potential 
terrorist attacks into categories. As with Study 1, Study 2 was primarily exploratory, and 
no specific hypotheses were tested. However, based on the findings from Study 1, type of
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
attack was expected to be used most often as a sorting criterion. Type of target was also 
expected to be commonly used to sort the scenarios.
Method
Participants
Forty-seven University of New Hampshire undergraduate students were used for 
Study 2. Demographic data was not collected. Students participated in groups of five. 
Participants were given partial course credit for their participation.
Materials
Participants were given a stack of 4x6 index cards. Each card contained a possible 
terrorist attack. These attacks were selected and adapted from Cockerham (n.d.). The 
complete list of stimuli is included in Appendix B. Participants were also given a blank 
index card on which to write their category descriptors.
Procedures
Participants signed up for the study and were given a place and time. Upon 
arrival, each participant was asked to read and sign an informed consent sheet. After 
agreeing to participate, participants were asked to sort their cards into categories. 
Participants were instructed to use between 2 and 7 categories, and to decide for 
themselves what categories to use and which cards to place in each category. They were 
also asked to give a brief description of each category when they were finished. Upon 
completion of the task, they were given a debriefing form and dismissed.
Results
A research assistant independently examined the descriptors provided by each 
participant and identified the criteria used to compile the categories. The investigator
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
tallied how many times each criterion was used. The results are presented in Table 4. It 
should be noted that many participants used multiple criteria to distinguish one category 
form another, so the totals do not sum to 49. The criterion most often used was the type 
of weapon used for the attack (n = 27), followed by the disruptiveness of the attack (n = 
20). Other common criteria were the number of people affected (n = 11), type of people 
affected (n -  10), and type of damage caused (n = 10). From these results it is apparent 
that the type of weapon used in an attack and the level of disruption are the most salient 
features of a potential terrorist attack. Both of these features will be used as event features 
for Study 4.
Table 4
Sorting Criteria: Potential Terrorist Attacks (Study 2)
Sorting Criteria Frequency % of Participants 
(N=49)
Weapon used 27 55.1
Level of disruption 20 40.8
Number of people affected 11 22.4
Type of people affected 10 20.4
Type of damage 10 20.4
Level of psychological damage 5 10.2
Type of target 4 8.2
Likelihood of occurrence 3 6.1
Threatened vs. actual attack 3 6.1
Level of actual damages 3 6.1
Sophistication 2 4.1
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Discussion
Once again the type of weapon was used more often than any other feature, which 
is consistent with Study 1, as well as with Slovic and Bums’ (2006) examination of event 
features. However, disruptiveness did not emerge as a categorization criteria in Study 1. 
Two possible explanations can be offered. First, the attacks in Study 1 were primarily in 
foreign countries (to avoid any participant’s personal familiarity from becoming a 
confounding variable), which may have led participants to not consider the impact it 
would have on the people nearby. Second, the characteristic of disruptiveness might only 
have been important for potential events, and not for events that have already happened. 
For past events, the status quo has already changed (and perhaps changed back), so this 
change is not salient. For future events, the disruption of the status quo is still an 
important consideration.
The use of disruptiveness to classify potential terrorist attacks is consistent with 
the risk literature, which finds that people use subjective qualitative evaluations when 
analyzing and responding to risks (Slovic 1992). However, in these risk studies, 
dismptiveness itself was not measured as one of the subjective dimensions of risk.
Study 2 identified type of weapon and level of disruptiveness as the most salient 
grouping features of potential terrorist events. Type of weapon will be manipulated for 
Studies 3 through 5, which will examine how these features relate to subjective ratings of 
risk. For this purpose, a new set of attacks were fabricated in which the type of weapon is 
a known factor. Level of dismptiveness will be used as a response variable.
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 provided a good empirical basis for the next three 
studies. Type of weapon, type of target, number of victims, presence of suicide, and
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judgments of disruptiveness are all important variables for understanding responses to 
terrorism. These variables will be considered further in the following three studies.
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V
STUDY 3: EVENT FEATURES AND INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Introduction
Study 3 was the first of the five studies that addressed the second purpose of this 
dissertation: to quantify the impact of event features on responses to terrorism. In 
addition, it also addressed purpose three: to identify natural groupings within the set of 
response variables. Finally, it addressed purposes four and five: examining the relations 
among individual characteristics, event features, and responses to terrorism events.
For this study a series of hypothetical terrorist attacks were fabricated, which 
differed on the event features identified in Study 1: type of weapon, type of target, 
number of victims, and suicide/non-suicide attackers. A number of individual 
characteristics were measured, including gender, tolerance for terrorism, fear and 
perceived risk of terrorism, adaptive behaviors, and political ideology. The predictive 
value of the event features and the individual characteristics were evaluated and 
compared.
Individual Characteristics and to Responses to Terrorism
Previous studies have found that individual characteristics such as age (Ford,
2004), gender (Shaw, 2003), family structure (Sprang, 2003), ethnicity (Miller & 
Heldring, 2004), media use (Snyder & Park, 2002), and coping strategies (Sprang, 2003)
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are related to how people react to terrorist events. Study 3 will measure gender, tolerance 
for terrorism, fear of terrorism, perceived risk of terrorism, adaptive behaviors, political 
ideology, and media use, to determine which of these, if any, are predictors of various 
responses to terrorist scenarios.
Several of these individual characteristics have been linked to responses to 
terrorism, so a particular result can be predicted. For gender, researchers have found that 
women tend to have a stronger fear and sadness reactions, whereas men tend to have a 
stronger anger reaction (Hoffner et al., 2002). The Gender Hypothesis predicted that men 
would score lower on fear, and higher on anger, than women. Media consumption of 
news has been linked to a stronger fear reaction to terrorist events (Brown et al., 2002), 
but that was specifically news regarding the event in question. Because the events in this 
study are completely hypothetical, there is no news coverage. However, information 
seeking should be positively related to fear responses. The Information Seeking 
Hypothesis predicted that participants who scored higher on information seeking after a 
terrorist event would also score higher on fear responses. Tolerance for terrorism has not 
been linked to reactions to a specific terrorist event, but anecdotal evidence suggests the 
Tolerance Hypothesis: participants who scored higher on tolerance of terrorism as 
political expression were predicted to be less angry, and that they would judge specific 
events as less serious.
Event Features and Responses to Terrorism
Studies 1 and 2 established that type of attack, number of victims, presence of 
suicide, type of target, and level of disruptiveness were salient features of terrorist 
attacks. In addition, Slovic and Bums (2006) found that type of attack, presence of
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suicide, and type of victims were all related to judgments of risk, but that number of 
victims was not. This study manipulated type of attack, type of victim, number of 
victims, and presence of suicide, and also controlled for disruptiveness, to determine 
which of these variables, if any, impacted responses to terrorism. The Event Features 
Hypothesis predicted that type of attack, suicide, number of victims, type of target, and 
dismptiveness would all be related to ratings of seriousness. Presence of suicide and 
number of victims should be positively related to seriousness (Slovic & Bums, under 
review, also see Study 1); attacks on government targets should be judged less serious 
than attacks on civilian targets (Slovic & Bums, under review); finally, based on the 
findings of Study 2, attacks seen as more dismptive should also be judged as more 
serious.
Event Features vs. Individual Characteristics
The Individual Characteristics Hypothesis predicted that individual characteristics 
predict responses to terrorism after accounting for the impact of event features. While 
there is ample empirical evidence that both individual and event features are important to 
responses to terrorism, both types of variables have not been included in a single analysis.
Method
Participants
Two hundred fifty participants were recruited via the University of New 
Hampshire Psychology Department’s participant pool. This pool consists of 
undergraduate psychology students who agree to participate in return for partial course 
credit. Participants signed up for the study without knowledge of the topic or procedures. 
Participants received partial course credit for their participation.
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One hundred seventy eight females and seventy-two males participated in this 
study. Ages ranged from 19 to 27 (M = 20.2, SD -  1.2). Racial composition was 
Caucasian (n -  128), Asian/Pacific Islander (n = 5), Black/African American (n = 3), 
Hispanic/Latino (n = 2), mixed race (n = 5), and undisclosed (n -  7). Religious 
identifications were Catholic (n = 93), no religion (n = 85), Protestant (n = 30), other 
Christian (n = 25), Jewish (n = 5), atheist (n = 6), Unitarian (n = 2), and 1 each of, 
Muslim, Hindu, agnostic, and pagan. Two participants were not United States Citizens, 
and were excluded from further analysis. The demographic composition of this sample, 
while relatively homogenous, was consistent with the Psychology Department’s 
participant pool.
Materials
Event features. The study was conducted using a survey format. The stimuli 
consisted of 40 terrorist scenarios (Appendix C). These scenarios consist of 5 types of 
attacks: conventional explosion, firearm, biological, chemical, and radioactive. The type 
of weapon was a within-subjects variable, so that each participant was asked for 
responses to a scenario for each level of weapon. Within each type of attack, eight 
separate conditions were used. These eight conditions varied based on presence of suicide 
(yes/no), type of target (government/civilian), and number of victims (several/several 
dozen). These features were between-subjects variables, so that each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of eight conditions (2x2x2 between-subjects design).
Individual characteristics. The individual characteristics were measured using a 
variety of scales. A standard set of demographic questions were used, which measured 
age, gender, ethnic background, religion, residence, citizenship, and political ideology.
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However, because of sample characteristics, it was expected that some of these 
characteristics would not have enough variance to be used in the analyses.
Fear of terrorism, perceived risk of terrorism, and adaptive behaviors were 
measured using the Attitude Toward Terrorism Scale developed by Jenkin and Cohn 
(under revision). This scale consists of 33 separate statements, which participants agree 
with on a six-point Likert scale (1 = “Strongly Disagree”; 6 = “Strongly Agree”). The 
ATTS consists of items designed to measure emotional fear of terrorism (“When I see a 
low-flying plane, I worry that it might crash”), perceived risk of victimization (“I think 
that I live in a place that is a good target for terrorists”), and behaviors related to 
terrorism (“I have an emergency supply kit”). Behavioral items used a simple “yes”/”no” 
response option.
Tolerance towards terrorism was assessed using the terrorism attitudes scale 
developed by Takooshian and Verdi (1995). This scale was designed to measure a 
participant’s tolerance for terrorism as a form of political expression by responses to a 
series of statements (ex. “Sometimes terrorism is the only way for dissenters to resist an 
unjust system”) on a 6-point Likert scales responses (1 = “Strongly Disgree”; 6 = 
“Strongly Agree”).
Response variables. Participants were asked for a number of responses as if the 
scenarios were real. They were asked to what extent they thought that the event was a 
serious one. They were also asked to what extent they felt that the event would be 
harmful to direct and indirect victims. Disruptiveness was measured by asking 
participants to estimate how much the scenario would disrupt the activities of local and 
federal government, the local population, and themselves.
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Information seeking was measured after each scenario by asking to what extent 
the participant would pay attention to and/or search out additional information about the 
scenario. Participants were asked to rate their answers on a Likert scale, where a higher 
score indicated a higher need for information. Each participant was also asked to indicate 
to what extent he/she would talk to others about each scenario.
Participants were also asked about their media consumption habits. Participants 
were asked how much they would support diplomatic and military retaliations to those 
responsible for the events. Finally, participants were asked for an estimate of the 
probability that the event would actually occur. The entire set of measures used in Study 
3 is included in Appendix D. These measures were used in Studies 3 through 5. Table 5 
shows the name and description of each major variable used in Studies 3, 4, and 5. Minor 
variables, such as emotional responses, are not included.
Table 5
Variables for Studies 3, 4, and 5
Variable Description
Event features
Type of weapon Within-subjects variable with up to six levels: bomb, biological, 
chemical, firearm, nuclear (Study 5 only), and radiological
Type of target Two levels: civilian target and government target
Presence of suicide Two levels: suicide and non-suicide (Study 3 only)
Number of victims Two levels: several deaths and several dozen deaths (Study 3 only)
Threat condition Two levels: threat and attack (Study 4 only)
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Table 5 (con’t)
Variables for Studies 3, 4, and 5
Variable Description
Response variables
Severity judgments Participant’s rating of seriousness, disruptiveness, and harmfulness for 
each scenario
Communication Participant’s rating of the extent to which he/she would give and 
receive information about each scenario
Estimated probability Participant’s rating of the probability that a given scenario would
of occuring actually occur
Individual characteristics
Gender Participant’s self-identification as male or female
Tolerance of terrorism An eleven item scale to measure the extent to which each participant 
agrees that terrorism is a legitimate form of political expression.
ATTS A thirty-three item scale to measure the extent to which each 
participant is afraid of terrorism, or perceives a high risk of terrorism
News interest A single-response item to measure how much each participant follows 
news related to homeland security issues (Study 5 only).
Subjective evaluations (Study 5 only)
Danger evaluations For a given scenario, participant’s ratings of the risk to U.S. 
population, his/her own personal risk, the potential for catastrophe, and 
the extent to which the risk is increasing for a given scenario
Knowledge For a given scenario, participant’s ratings of the extent to which
evaluations experts know about the risk, the extent to which victims know they 
have been exposed, and the amount of control victims have over their 
consequences
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Procedures
Participants signed up for the study in groups of 30. Upon arrival, each participant 
signed a consent form (which was kept separate from the surveys to protect 
confidentiality). After consenting, participants were given one of the eight survey 
conditions to complete. Each survey consisted of one scenario condition (for each of the 
five attacks), and the scales and items listed above. After completing the survey, 
participants were debriefed and dismissed. Male and female participants were run 
separately to ensure that each cell is filled proportionally with each gender.
Results
The Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale demonstrated very high internal reliability, 
Cronbach’s a = .93. The Tolerance for Terrorism Scale had moderate reliability, a = .71. 
Response variables for the biological scenarios were entered into a principal components 
factor analysis with a Varimax rotation. Factors with an Eigenvalue greater than one were 
retained. This analysis revealed that response variables “seriousness,” “harmfulness,” and 
“dismptiveness” all loaded onto one factor; these responses were combined into a 
“judgment of severity.” In addition, the four response items dealing with information 
seeking and sharing loaded onto a second factor; these were combined into a 
“communication” response variable. The support for military retaliation did not load onto 
either factor; support for diplomatic retaliation was not entered into the analysis due to a 
lack of variability. These factor loadings are presented in Table 6. Because this analysis 
was substantively replicated with other weapon scenarios, these response divisions are 
used for the remainder of the analyses.
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Table 6




Disruption of U.S. population .72* .29 .61
Disruption of Federal government .71* .08 .52
Harmful to U.S. population .70* .18 .53
Harmful to local area .69* .21 .52
Disruption of local government .67* - .02 .45
Seriousness .66* .24 .49
Disruption to local area .63* .15 .41
Disruption to respondent .57* .38 .48
Try to talk to others .17 .86* .77
Seek information .24 .81* .71
Willing to talk to others .04 .78* .63
Pay attention to information .43 .74* .74
Support military retaliation .50 .28 .33






Note. * factor loading > .50; Factors with Eigenvalue > 1 were retained.
Individual Characteristics and Responses to Terrorism
Gender Hypothesis. The Gender Hypothesis predicted that women would score 
higher on fear, and that men would score higher on anger. Independent-sample r-tests 
were conducted to determine of men and women scored differently on these responses. 
For fear, r(240) = 6.78, p < .001, with women demonstrating a significantly higher fear 
response than did men. For anger, f(239) = 1.99, p = .048, also with women scoring 
significantly higher than did men. The Gender Hypothesis is only partially supported: 
women did score higher than men on fear, which was predicted, but they also scored 
higher than men on anger, which was the opposite of what was predicted.
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Communication Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that higher scores on the 
fear response would be positively correlated with higher ratings on interpersonal 
communication. Based on the factor analysis discussed above, the four survey items that 
dealt with information seeking and information sharing were combined into one 
“communication” item for each attack. The four interpersonal communication items had 
strong reliability, Cronbach’s a = .93, so they were combined for this analysis (due to a 
ceiling effect, radiological attacks were excluded). The overall interpersonal 
communication variable was Winsorized to account for outliers. The correlation between 
overall interpersonal communication and fear response was significant, r(241) = .42, p < 
.001, and in the expected direction. This result indicates that higher levels of fear are 
associated with higher levels of interpersonal communication, and is consistent with the 
hypothesis.
Tolerance Hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that tolerance for terrorism 
would be negatively related to anger and severity judgments. Severity was computed by 
combining the severity scores (from the factor analysis discussed above), with the 
exception of the radiological attack scores, which showed a ceiling effect (for the severity 
ratings, Cronbach’s a -  .85).
The correlation matrix showed that anger, r(236) = -.33, p < .001 and severity, 
r(234) = -.16, p -  .014, were both significantly correlated with tolerance toward 
terrorism, even after a Bonferroni correction (a = .05/2 = .025). Both correlations were in 
the expected direction, indicating that as tolerance toward terrorism increased, anger 
responses and judgments of seriousness both decreased.
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Event Features Hypothesis: Event Features Will Be Related to Responses to Terrorism
Event features and judgments o f severity. A 4x2x2x2 Mixed ANOVA was used to 
test for effects of event features on judgments of severity (see Table 7). There was a main 
effect for weapon, F(3, 643) = 28.33, p < .001, rj = .11; there was also a main effect for 
type of target, F (l, 231) = 4.16, p  = .043, rj2 = .02. An examination of the means showed 
that attacks on government targets were considered more severe than attacks on civilian 
targets (Figure 2). Planned comparisons revealed that bomb attacks were rated as more 
severe than all other attacks, and that firearm attacks were rated as less severe than all 
other attacks. However, biological and chemical attacks showed no significant difference.
Table 7









Note. Means with the same superscript were 
not significantly different, p < .05
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Figure 2
Main Effect o f Weapon on Judgments o f Severity (Study 3)
Biological Bomb Chemical Firearm
Figure 3
Main Effect o f Target on Judgments o f Severity (Study 3)
Civilian Government
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Event features and communication. An ANOVA was also used to test for effects 
of event features on communication responses (see Table 8). For communication, there 
was a main effect for weapon, F(3, 723) = 11.71, p < .001, rj2 -  .05. There was a 
significant interaction for weapon and target, F(3, 723) = 3.27, p  = .021, rj2 -  .01. Figure 
4 indicates that for bomb attacks, there was no difference between government and 
civilian targets, but that for the other three types of weapons, government targets fostered 
lower communication scores than did civilian targets. There was also a significant 
interaction for type of target and presence of suicide, F (l, 241) = 4.52, p = 0.034, rj2 = 
.02. Figure 5 indicates that there were higher communication scores for civilian attacks 
when suicide was present; when the attacker escaped, communication scores were higher 
for government attacks.
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Table 8



























Note. Significant interactions for weapon x target and 
for suicide x target, p < .05
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Figure 4
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Event features estimated probability. An ANOVA was also used to test whether 
estimated probabilities were affected by event features (see Table 9). The results for the 
dependent variable of estimated probability that the scenarios would actually occur 
showed only a significant main effect for weapon, F(4, 948) = 29.30, p < .001, rj2 -  .11 
(Figure 6). The number of victims, type of target, or presence of suicide did not impact 
estimated probability. Planned post hoc comparisons revealed that the firearm attack was 
seen as most probable, followed by bomb attacks, then biological and chemical attacks, 
then radiological attacks. All differences were significant except for the difference 
between biological and chemical attacks.
Table 9







Note. Means with the same superscript were 
not significantly different, p  < .05
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Figure 6
Main Effect o f Weapon on Estimated Probability (Study 3)
Biological Bomb Chemical Firearm Radiological
Individual Characteristics vs. Event features (Individual Characteristics Hypothesis)
The following analyses address the issue of whether the manipulated event 
features or the measured individual characteristics had a stronger relation with the 
dependent variables of severity, communication, and probability. For individual 
characteristics, gender, Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale (ATTS; fear and perceived risk 
were combined for the regression because of their moderate intercorrelation), and 
Tolerance for Terrorism were included.
Judgments o f severity. Linear regression models were used to evaluate the joint 
impact of event features and individual characteristics on judgments of severity. Because 
level of weapon was a within-subjects design, and could not be included in the model,
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this factor was controlled by doing a separate regression for each level of weapon. Target 
was entered as a binary variable, and the individual characteristics were entered on the 
same step. After a Bonferroni adjustment (a = .05/4 = .013), the ATTS was significant 
for both firearm and bomb attacks. These results indicate that fear and perceived risk of 
terrorism are significant after predictors of severity for some attacks, even after 
controlling for the event features of the attacks.
Table 10
P ’s for Series o f Regressions: Judgments o f Severity (Study 3)
Variables
Type of Weapon Used
Biological Bomb Chemical Firearm
Target .10 (.01) .17* (.03) .11 (.02) .14 (.02)
ATTS .12 (.01) .22* (.04) .17* (.03) .18* (.03)
Tolerance -.13 (-.02) -.03 (.00) -.05 (.00) -.09 (.01)
Gender .09 (.01) .09 (.01) -.04 (.00) .06 (.00)
Model
F (4, 221) 3.82* 5.63*** 2.55 4.35*
R .25 .30 .21 .27
2
Note. Values in parentheses are sr . “ATTS” = Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale. *p < 
.013 (Bonferroni adjustment); **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Communication. Regression models were also used to evaluate the joint impact of 
the event features and individual characteristics on communication responses. The 
regressions for communication included target and suicide on the first step, because these 
factors were significant in the ANOVA. The individual characteristics were gender, 
ATTS, and tolerance. The series of regressions were consistent (Table 11). In each 
model, ATTS was the only significant predictor of communication. These results indicate 
that the Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale is an important predictor of communication 
following a terrorist attack, even when event features were controlled.
Table 11
P ’s for Series o f Regressions: Judgments o f Severity (Study 3)
Variables
Type of Weapon Used
Biological Bomb Chemical Firearm
Target -.11 (.01) .01 (.03) -.10 (.01) -.05 (.02)
Suicide .08 (.01) .03 (.00) .09 (.01) .07 (.00)
ATTS .26*** (.06) .28*** (.07) .24*** (.05) .26*** (.06)
Tolerance -.07 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.03 (.00) -.06 (.00)
Gender .01 (.00) .04 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Model
F (5, 222) 5.18*** 4.11** 4.19** 4.34**
R .32 .29 .29 .30
9
Note. Values in parentheses are s r .  “ATTS” = Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale. *p < 
.013 (Bonferroni adjustment); **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Estimated probability. A series of regression was also used to test whether 
individual characteristics were significant predictors of estimated probability of 
occurrence, after accounting for event features. In the ANOVA, only weapon had a 
significant main effect; this factor was controlled by performing a separate regression for 
each type of weapon. No event features were entered into the regression models. The 
predictors were gender, tolerance of terrorism, and the fear portion of the ATTS (the 
perceived risk portion was excluded due to its similarity with probability estimates). 
Again, the results were consistent across levels of weapon (Table 12). Fear of terrorism 
was the only significant predictor for all four models. These results indicate that fear of 
terrorism is an important characteristic after accounting for the type of weapon.
Table 12
P ’s for Series o f Regressions: Judgments o f Severity (Study 3)
Variables
Type of Weapon Used
Biological Bomb Chemical Firearm
Fear of Terrorism .32*** (.09) .40*** (.14) .43*** (.17) .38*** (.12)
Tolerance -.09 (.01) -.03 (.00) -.07 (.01) .02 (.00)
Gender .06 (.00) .04 (.00) .02 (.00) .00 (.00)
Model
F (3, 233) 12.86*** 16.27*** 20.28*** 12.52***
R .38 .42 .46 .37
2Note. Values in parentheses are sr ,*p < .013 (Bonferroni adjustment); **p < .01;
***p  <  .001.
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Discussion
Individual Characteristics and Responses to Terrorist Scenarios
The Gender Hypothesis was only partially supported: females did score higher on 
fear responses than did males, as predicted, but females also scored higher on anger 
responses, which was the opposite of the prediction. These results only partially replicate 
findings from Hoffner, et al (2002) and Shaw (2003), who found that men scored higher 
on anger than did women. There are a number of possible reasons for the discrepancies. 
First, both of the referenced articles dealt with actual terrorism, while this study used 
hypothetical scenarios. It is difficult enough to accurately identify an emotional state after 
it has passed; it is even more difficult to accurately identify an emotional state that is 
conditional on some future event. The extreme emotional responses seen in this study, 
and the small amount of variance in several of the responses, allow for the possibility that 
participants were identifying and personalizing stereotypical emotional reactions to the 
scenarios.
The Communication Hypothesis was supported; communication, including 
information seeking, was positively related to the fear response to the scenarios. This 
result supports Brown et al (2002), with one added benefit. Brown et al linked media 
consumption with fear, but it was just as likely that media consumption caused fear as 
that fear caused media consumption. In the current study it is still statistically impossible 
to draw either conclusion, but one direction does seem more logical than the other. 
Because this study did not measure actual media consumption, but rather measured 
predicted media consumption, it makes more sense that the fear response might lead to 
increased media consumption. It is less probable that hypothetical media consumption
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would increase the hypothetical fear response. However, it must be reiterated that the 
statistical techniques used here can in no way imply such causality.
The Tolerance Hypothesis was also supported. While there was no previous 
empirical work on which to draw, it was predicted that tolerance for terrorism as a means 
of political expression would be negatively related to anger and seriousness. These 
relations were significant and in the hypothesized direction. These results provide the 
first empirical link between tolerance for terrorism and emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioral responses to terrorism. This construct, and its impact on responses to 
terrorism, is worth further empirical study.
Event Features and Responses to Terrorism
Judgments o f severity. The impact of event features on responses to terrorism is 
complicated, and depends on the particular response being considered. For judgments of 
severity, both the type of weapon and the type of target had independent effects. 
Specifically, attacks on state capitol buildings were viewed as more severe than attacks 
on shopping malls. This result is contrary to Slovic and Bums (2006), who found that 
attacks were viewed as more serious if they had civilian targets. Two explanations seem 
probable. First, this study identified physical locations as the target, while Slovic and 
Bums identified groups of people as the target. It is possible that the government attacks 
in this study were viewed as more serious because they took place at a government 
location. The second reason is related: because of the loadings in the factor analysis, 
these results took into account judgments of harmfulness and dismptiveness when 
computing a seriousness score. Slovic and Bums used a more global assessment of 
seriousness, in which participants may not have explicitly considered harmfulness and
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disruptiveness. Either of these differences, or both, may account for the contradictory 
results. Future research endeavors should look at different facets of “target,” including 
location and person.
Beside the main effect of target, weapon was also an important factor. Bomb 
attacks were seen as more severe than other weapons, and firearm attacks were seen as 
less severe than the other types of weapons. This is also contradictory to Slovic and 
Bums’ (2006) study, which found that biological attacks were viewed as more serious 
than bomb attacks. Slovic and Bums used a greater amount of detail in their stimuli than 
were used here. Study 4 used a more detailed account of biological versus bomb attacks. 
Those results should assist in the interpretation of this one.
Communication. This dependent variable revealed an interaction between weapon 
and target. Communication scores were higher for civilian target, except for bomb 
attacks, in which case the target did not matter. These results indicate a greater desire for 
information about civilian casualties, but this effect depends on the type of weapon used 
in the attack. Again, perhaps bomb attacks (especially on government locations) have a 
greater emotional salience that masks differences in communication due to target.
Estimated probability. As with severity, estimated probability of occurrence 
demonstrated a main effect for weapon only. Firearm attacks were viewed as most 
probable, followed by bomb attacks, then biological and chemical attacks, and finally by 
radiological attacks. This pattern seems fairly consistent with real-world occurrences of 
these types of attacks (with the possible exception that bombings may be more common 
than firearm attacks).
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It should also be noted that the lack of any effect for the number of victims 
replicated Slovic and Burns (2006), who found that the number of victims was not a 
significant predictor of responses to hypothetical terrorist attacks.
Individual vs. Event Features
For each of the dependent variables of interest (severity, communication, and 
probability), fear and/or perceived risk of terrorism were significant predictors after 
controlling for the relevant event features. Obviously, many other individual 
characteristics were not measured and analyzed, and future studies should undertake 
empirical evaluations of many other such characteristics. However, it must be noted that 
the regression models were sometimes different based on which type of weapon was 
being responded to. These results do not validate the current emphasis on such 
demographic and psychographic variables in the literature. The type of weapon used in 
the attack can potentially affect the relative importance of individual characteristics.
The regression models used in Study 3 did not evaluate the impact of type of 
weapon along with the individual characteristics; they only controlled for it. It was left 
until Study 5 to evaluate the relative impact of this event feature, when subjective 
evaluations could also be included in the model.
A weakness of this third study is that the events are hypothetical. Many of the 
social factors that influenced the response to 9/11 or Oklahoma City, such as the grief of 
friends and neighbors, the bombardment of political speeches, and the minute-by-minute 
press coverage, are simply not present. These factors are extremely important to personal 
and community responses to terrorist events, and excluding them from the design of this 
study, while necessary, will certainly have an impact on the severity of the responses, if
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
not the character of the responses. Other weaknesses, which are shared by other studies 
proposed here, are discussed later.
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CHAPTER VI
STUDY 4: RESPONSES TO THREATS AND ATTACKS
Introduction
Study 4 was designed to determine whether participants would respond differently 
based on whether an actual attack was part of the scenario, and it is the first empirical 
study to do so. Because the presence of an attack is an event feature, this study addressed 
the second purpose of this dissertation: to determine the effect of event features on 
responses to terrorism. Two hypotheses were tested for this study, that reactions to threats 
differ from reactions to attacks, and that reactions differ based on weapon used. 
Differences Between Actual Attacks and Threats
As discussed above, no empirical work has been done that compares actual and 
threatened terrorist events. However, there should be differences. People respond 
differently to a threat than an actual attack, and this phenomenon should also apply to 
terrorism. The Threat Hypothesis predicted that attack scenarios would evoke higher 
levels of anger, lower levels of fear, higher judgments of severity, higher levels of 
communication, and lower judgments of likelihood than would the threat scenarios. 
Differences Between Car Bombs and Infectious Disease Releases
This difference should be consistent with the Event Features Hypothesis from 
Study 1, which found that different types of attacks are viewed as distinct, as well as with
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Slovic and Bums (2006), who found that infectious disease attacks were rated as more 
serious than explosions. Risk perception research has also found that negative 
consequences that take place over time (such as an epidemic) are viewed as more serious 
than negative consequences that occur at a specific point in time (such as an explosion) 
(Slovic, 2002). For Study 4, the Event Features Hypothesis predicted that the infectious 
disease scenario would be judged as more severe, and that it would evoke higher levels of 
communication than the bomb scenario.
Method
Participants
Seventy four participants were recruited via the University of New Hampshire 
Psychology Department’s participant pool. This pool consists of undergraduate 
psychology students who agree to participate in return for partial course credit. 
Participants signed up for the study without knowledge of the topic or procedures. 
Participants received partial course credit for their participation.
Of the original seventy-four participants, thirteen were excluded from the study 
for inconsistent data (see below). Forty-two females and nineteen males were actually 
included in the final data set. Ages ranged from 19 to 27 (M = 20.2, SD = 1.2).
Participants included Caucasian (n = 56), Black/African American (n = 2), 
Hispanic/Latino (n = 1), and mixed race (n — 2). Religious affiliations included Catholic 
{n = 22), no religion (n = 15), Protestant (n -  9), other Christian (n = 11), Mormon (n =
2), Jewish (n = 1), and agnostic (n -  1). All participants were U.S. citizens. The 
demographic composition of this sample, while relatively homogenous, is consistent with 
the Psychology Department’s participant pool.
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Materials
For this study, four scenarios were fabricated (Appendix E), which varied across 
two factors. One scenario was a car bomb, and the other was the release of an infectious 
disease. For each type of weapon, one scenario was presented as a credible threat, while 
the other scenario was presented as an attack. Participants received the same set of 
individual characteristics and response measures as in Study 3.
Procedure
After signing a consent form, participants were randomly given on of two 
surveys. One half of the participants were given the threat scenarios, and one-half were 
given the attack scenarios. After completing the survey, they were asked to identify 
(without looking back) if the scenarios were threat or attack scenarios. This question was 
asked as a manipulation check to determine if participants accurately perceived whether 
their scenarios were attacks or threats. Thirteen participants were not able to accurately 
identify their scenarios, and were excluded from the analyses.
Results
Threat Hypothesis
The Threat Hypothesis predicted that responses would be different for the threat 
scenarios than for the attack scenarios. A MANOVA was used to test whether the pattern 
of emotional responses was the same across the different event features. For the 
MANOVA, the emotional responses were the dependent variables of interest. However, 
several emotional measures were excluded for various statistical or procedural reasons. 
“Contempt” was excluded because many participants did not respond, and some indicated 
that they did not understand the definition. “Happiness” and “satisfaction” were excluded
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because of a lack of variability (all but one respondent marked the lowest possible value). 
“Confidence” was excluded because of a definite floor effect. Finally, “excitement” was 
excluded from the analysis because it was unclear whether students interpreted this as a 
general increase in energy levels (as intended) or a positive anticipation. For the 
MANOVA, then, the five dependent variables were fear, anger, anxiety, surprise, and 
frustration. However, the one-way MANOVA (with threat factor as the independent 
factor) showed no significant multivariate differences, Wilkes’ A(5, 45) = .08, p  = .610. 
An examination of the univariate analyses did not reveal any significant differences for 
any emotional response.
Threat Hypothesis (continued) and Event Features Hypothesis
As in Study 3, the Event Features Hypothesis predicted that event features would 
impact responses to terrorism. A 2x2 mixed-design ANOVA was conducted to determine 
if the event features affected judgments of severity. Weapon was entered as the within- 
subjects factor, and threat condition was entered as the between-subjects factor. The
■y
results revealed a main effect for type of weapon, F(l, 49) = 10.23, p -  .002, rf  = . 17 
(Table 13). There was no main effect for threat condition, nor was there a significant 
interaction. These results indicate that biological attacks were viewed as more severe than 
were bomb attacks (Figure 7).
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Table 13




Note. Means with the same superscript were
not significantly different, p  < .05
Figure 7















An ANOVA was also used to test whether type of attack or threat condition 
impacted communication responses. For communication as the dependent variable, there 
was no main effect either for weapon or for threat condition. However, there was a
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significant weapon by condition interaction, F(l, 59) = 5.49, p = .022, r| 2 = .09 (Table 
14). Communication ratings were higher for the biological threat, but lower for the 
biological attack (Figure 8 ). These results indicate that the communication pattern after a 
terrorist scenario depends on both the type of weapon and whether there is an actual 
attack present.
Table 14
Means: Communication (Study 4)
Weapon Condition M(SD)
Biological Threat 22.56 (2.97)
Attack 21.58 (3.89)
Bomb Threat 21.59 (3.70)
Attack 21.75 (3.82)
Note. Significant interaction for weapon by condition, 
p < .05.
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Figure 8
Presence o f Suicide by Target Interaction on Communication (Study 4)
□  Threat 
II Attack
Biological Bomb
An ANOVA was also used to test for differences in estimated probability of 
occurrence based on type of weapon and threat condition. For estimated probability, a 
similar pattern was revealed as for severity. First, the estimated probability for disease 
scenarios was Winsorized to correct for outliers. The 2x2 mixed ANOVA yielded a main 
effect for weapon only, F( 1, 48) = 17.60, p < .001, r)2 = .27, with bomb judged as more 
probable than infectious disease (Table 15, Figure 9). Neither threat condition nor the 
interaction term was significant. While bomb actions were viewed as more probable than 
disease actions, threats were not viewed as significantly more probable than attacks.
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Table 15
Means: Estimated Probability (Study 4)
Weapon_____________M(SD)
Biological 38.16b (21.19)
Bomb  48.88a (22.32)
Note. Means with the same superscript were 
not significantly different, p < .05
Figure 9
Main Effect o f Weapon on Estimated Probability (Study 4)
BombBiological
Discussion
Study 4 was the first empirical study to evaluate whether past and future attacks 
evoke different responses in observers. Given the importance of threats to the political 
goals of terrorist organizations (Long 1990), it is important to examine whether the threat
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or the attack produce the reactions that terrorist organizations desire. Study 4 replicated 
Slovic and Bums’ (2006) finding that infectious disease attacks were viewed as more 
severe than bomb attacks, and it extend that study by examining which other response 
variables are also impacted. This pattern of results is not consistent with those found in 
Study 3, which found that bombings were rated as more severe than diseases.
The most likely reason for this difference is some effect due to the level of 
information given. Study 4 offered a much more specific scenario than did Study 3, as 
did Slovic and Bums’ (2006) study that found the same effect. Such an effect should be 
examined in future research. Another, less likely reason is that the greater number of 
victims mentioned in the disease scenario drove the effect. This reason is less likely, 
because neither Study 3—which used moderate victim manipulations—nor Slovic and 
Bums—who used extreme victim manipulations—found an effect for number of victims. 
However, given the importance of the number of victims to the sorting task in Study 1, 
such an effect should not be ruled out.
As in Study 3, there was an interaction for communication response. This 
interaction indicated that communication ratings were higher for the biological scenario 
when it was a threat, but higher for the bomb scenario when it was an attack. It may be 
that the disease scenario was more relevant than the bomb scenario as threats, because 
exposure to biological threats is more controllable, and they have a potentially much 
larger geographical area of impact. However, as attack scenarios, a bombing has more 
information available as pictures, damage reports, etc., than does a spreading disease. 
This was the only result which suggested that threats are responded to differently than 
attacks are. Reasons for this lack of effects due to threat are discussed below.
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There was also a significant main effect for estimated probability, with bombings 
rated as significantly more probable than biological scenarios. This result is not 
surprising, because terrorist bombings have actually occurred in the U.S. multiple times, 
while infectious disease attacks have only occurred once (anthrax in the fall of 2 0 0 1 ), and 
are not generally seen as stereotypical of terrorist actions. This result is consistent with 
the estimated probabilities from Study 3.
Comparisons between threats and attacks were directly not significant for any of 
the tested dependent variables, and this lack of significance may be due to weaknesses 
inherent in the study. One weakness is the stimuli used. In order to directly compare 
responses, it was essential that the attack and the threat both present the same 
information. However, this is rarely the case. In most instances the level of specificity in 
a threat is much lower, and sometimes that threat is nothing more than a simple 
announcement of target or method. This unrealistic similarity among the scenarios may 
have masked any response differential that may exist in the real world.
Another problem that may have masked real differences between responses to 
threats and responses to attacks is the weakness of the manipulation. Because both the 
threat and the attack scenario are presented as hypothetical, participants may respond to 
them in a more similar way than if they were encountered in actuality. They may both be 
seen as hypothetical scenarios, rather than a hypothetical attack and a hypothetical threat. 
A manipulation check question was included, and incorrect surveys were excluded, but 
correct interpretation of the stimuli does not guarantee that participants responded as they 
would in a real situation.
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Taken as a whole, the results from Study 4 seem to indicate that subjects were 
more sensitive to the weapon involved in a terrorist scenario than whether the scenario 
presented a threat or an attack. These results may be due to a hyper-sensitivity to threats, 
or to weaknesses inherent in the manipulations.
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CHAPER Vn
STUDY 5: INCLUDING SUBJECTIVE EVLAUATIONS
Introduction
Study 5 was a replication and extension of Study 3. It was a replication in that the 
same individual characteristics and dependent variables were examined, as well as some 
of the same event features. These variables were subject to the same analyses used in the 
previous study. Study 5 extended Study 3 in two important ways. First, Study 5 used 
terrorism scenarios presented as threats rather than actual attacks. As threats, fewer event 
features could be manipulated, because less is known about an attack that might happen 
than an attack—even a hypothetical one—that has happened. For example, the number of 
victims, as well as the presence of suicide, cannot be known for a terrorist threat. Second, 
by using terrorist threats as the stimuli, this study can tap into the literature of risk 
perception, and examine which subjective characteristics of risk perception models are 
relevant to terrorism. Study 5 addressed purpose two: evaluating the impact of event 
features on responses to terrorism; as well as purposes four through seven; examining 
relations among event features, individual characteristics, and subjective evaluations of 
the scenarios.
The features most salient to terrorism threats (from Study 2) were the type of 
attack and the level of disruptiveness. Type of attack was manipulated at six levels:
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explosions, firearms, biological, chemical, radioactive, and nuclear. In addition to type of 
attack, threats also varied across two levels of target—government and civilian. 
Dismptiveness was not varied as an event feature, but was instead included in the 
response variables.
The second set of variables was the subjective evaluations of each threat. The 
subjective evaluation of a threat has been found to be important predictors of response to 
that threat. Past research has identified several subjective characteristics that are 
consistently related to attitudes. These subjective characteristics were measured for each 
threat to determine which were related to the event features and/or the individual 
characteristics.
The third set of variables was the same individual characteristics used in Study 3. 
Study 5 examined how individual characteristics were related to subjective characteristics 
as well as the response variables.
The fourth set of variables was response to the terrorism threats. Study 5 used the 
same response variables as Study 3. These four sets of variables were examined in the 
following hypotheses.
Individual Characteristics Will Be Related to Responses to Terrorism
These findings should replicate the Gender Hypothesis, Communication 
Hypothesis, and Tolerance Hypothesis from Study 3: fear should be higher for women, 
anger should be higher for men, and information seeking should be related to fear. 
Individual Characteristics and Subjective Evaluations
The relation between individual characteristics and subjective evaluations is one 
not well addressed in the risk literature. However, one significant and robust finding from
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the risk literature is that men perceive overall risk to be significantly less than do women 
(Slovic, 1999). The “Risk Hypothesis” predicted that gender would be related to 
perceived risk, with men scoring lower than women.
Event Features Will Be Related to Responses to Terrorism
The same hypotheses from Study 3 were tested in this study. Specifically, there 
should be differences in seriousness among the types of attack, and type of target (both 
from the Event Features Hypothesis), with higher judgments of severity for attacks on 
civilian targets. Number of victims and presence of suicide were not manipulated here, 
because the stimuli represent potential attacks, for which this information would not be 
known.
Subjective Characteristics Will Account for the Relation Between Event Features and 
Responses to Terrorism
A primary assumption of the psychometric paradigm is that evaluations of a 
threat, rather than the threat itself, mediate responses (Slovic, 1992). If the psychometric 
paradigm does indeed apply to terrorist events, than changing event features should 
influence responses to hazards insofar as those changes alter the subjective qualitative 
evaluations of that hazard. The “Psychometric Hypothesis” predicted that subjective 




Sixty participants were recruited via the University of New Hampshire 
Psychology Department’s participant pool. This pool consists of undergraduate
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psychology students who agree to participate in return for partial course credit. 
Participants signed up for the study without knowledge of the topic or procedures. 
Participants received partial course credit for their participation.
Forty-one females and nineteen males participated in this study. Ages ranged 
from 19 to 24 (M  = 20.2, SD -  1.2) Participants included Caucasian (n = 58), 
Black/African American (n -  1), and Hispanic/Latino (n = 1). Religious affiliations 
included Catholic (n -  25), no religion (n = 17), Protestant (n = 6), other Christian (n =
8 ), atheists (n = 2), Jewish (n = 1), and Christian Science (n = 1). All participants were 
U.S citizens. The demographic composition of this sample, while relatively homogenous, 
is consistent with the Psychology Department’s participant pool.
Materials
Twelve terrorist threat scenarios were fabricated for this study (Appendix F). 
These scenarios consisted of explosive, firearm, biological, chemical, radioactive, and 
nuclear terrorist attacks on both government and civilian targets. Participants were asked 
to rate each scenario on several subjective dimensions adapted from the risk perception 
literature (Appendix G). For each scenario, participants were asked to respond to the 
same items used in Study 3. Participants were also given the same individual 
characteristic items used in Study 3: demographics, media consumption, fear and 
perceived risk of terrorism, adaptive behaviors, and tolerance for terrorism.
Procedures
Participants signed up to complete the survey in groups of 30. Upon arrival each 
participant was asked to sign a consent form. After signing, he or she was given the 
survey. Each participant was given all twelve six scenarios for one target condition. After
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completing the survey, participants were debriefed and dismissed. Male and female 
participants were run separately to ensure that each cell is filled proportionally with both 
genders.
Results
The Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale demonstrated very high internal validity, 
Cronbach’s a -  .93. The Tolerance of Terrorism Scale had fair reliability, a = .77. The 
factor analysis of the response variables was not repeated, because the number of 
participants used in Study 5 (N = 60) was not sufficient. Instead, the response factors 
from Study 3 (severity and communication) were reconstructed, and tested for internal 
reliability. For severity, a = .85, and for communication, a = .93. Both factors 
demonstrated strong internal reliability.
Individual Characteristics Will Be Related to Responses to Terrorism
Gender Hypothesis. The Gender Hypothesis predicted that women would score 
higher than men on fear responses, and that men would score higher than women on 
anger responses. As in Study 3, a /-test was used to examine gender differences. There 
was a significant difference between genders for fear, t{51) = 3.79, p < 0.001, but no 
significant difference for anger. These results partially replicate the findings reported in 
Study 3: women scored higher on fear response, but there was no difference for anger 
responses.
Communication Hypothesis. The Communication Hypothesis was that 
communication responses would be positively related to fear responses. Communication 
was computed by summing the information seeking and information sharing scores for 
each scenario. As in Study 3, this correlation was positive and significant, r(58) = .53, p <
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.001. Participants who scored higher on interpersonal communication also scored 
significantly higher on their fear responses.
Tolerance Hypothesis. The Tolerance Hypothesis predicted that the Tolerance of 
Terrorism Scale would be negatively related to anger ratings and judgments of severity. 
Each participant’s score for tolerance of terrorism was correlated with average ratings of 
anger and severity. However, neither of these correlations was significant.
Individual Characteristics and Subjective Characteristics (Risk Hypothesis)
The subjective evaluations were summed across all six terrorism scenarios and 
factor analyzed. The results of the factor analysis are presented in Table 16. Based on 
previous psychometric paradigm studies, the items were forced into two factors with a 
Varimax rotation (also because two factors are easier to conceptualize, and thus more 
useful). The evaluations of overall risk, increasing threat, personal risk, and catastrophic 
potential all loaded onto a single factor; this factor was termed “danger evaluation.” 
Knowledge of exposure, expert knowledge, and control over consequences loaded onto 
the second factor; this factor was termed “knowledge evaluation.”
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Table 16




Catastrophic potential of threat .70* - . 0 1 .49
Threat increasing over time .64* .17 .44
U.S. population’s risk of exposure .63* -.16 .42
Personal risk of exposure .59* . 1 0 .35
Knowledge of exposure .14 .73* .56
Threat is known to experts . 2 1 .6 6 * .48
Control over consequences -.13 .65* .44
Dread of consequences .35 .17 .15
Severity of consequences .40 - . 0 1 .16
Preventability of exposure -.30 .30 .18
Novelty of threat .34 .28 . 2 2
Immediacy of threat -.04 .31 . 1 0






Note. * factor loading > .50
Each factor was regressed on individual characteristics: gender, tolerance of 
terrorism, and fear and perceived risk of terrorism (perceived risk was omitted from the 
danger evaluations model because of its similarity). For the danger evaluations, the model 
was significant F(3, 56) = 3.89, p  = .014, adj. R2 -  .13. Fear of terrorism was the only 
significant predictor (Table 17). The regression model for the knowledge evaluations was 
not significant. These results indicate that the individual characteristics studied here had 
only a limited impact on subjective evaluations.
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Table 17
Linear Regression: Danger Evaluations (Study 5)
Variable B SEB P
Fear of Terrorism .48 .19 .33*
Tolerance of Terrorism -.32 .32 -.13
Gender 1.63 5.80 .04
Note. *p < .05
Event Features and Responses to Terrorism (Event Features Hypothesis)
Event features and judgments o f severity. For judgments of severity, the nuclear 
scenario was not included in the analysis, because of a ceiling effect. The resulting 5x2 
mixed design ANOVA tested whether judgments of severity were impacted by type of 
weapon and/or type of target. This ANOVA revealed a main effect for weapon F(4, 220)
= 18.10, p < .001, rj -  .25, and a significant weapon by target interaction, F(4, 220) =
24.65, p  = .001, rj = .08 (Table 18). An examination of the interaction revealed that the 
bomb scenario was rated more severe when it had a civilian target; each other scenario 
was rated more severe if it had a government target (Figure 10).
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Table 18
































Note. Significant interaction for weapon x target, 
p  < .05
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Event features and communication. A 6x2 ANOVA was used to test for 
differences in communication responses across weapon and target. AH levels of weapon 
were included because the distributions were acceptably normal. There was a main effect 
for weapon, F(5, 290) = 26.811, p < .001, rj2 = .32, but there was no main effect for 
target, and no interaction.
Planned post hoc comparisons directly compared communication ratings for each 
type of weapon. As expected, the ratings were significantly higher for nuclear scenarios 
than any other scenario (Table 19; Figure 11). The bomb and biological scenarios were 
rated lower than all other scenarios (except each other). There were no differences among 
radiological, chemical, and firearm scenarios.
Table 19






Nuclear 2 2 .lT  (4.47)
Radiological 19.58° (4.82)
Note. Means with the same superscript were 
not significantly different, p < .05
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Figure 11
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Note. “Bio” = biological; “Chem” = chemical; “Gun” = Firearm; “Nuke” = 
nuclear; “Rad” = radiological.
Event features and estimated probability. An ANOVA was also used to evaluate 
the impact of event features on estimated probability of occurrence The results for the 
estimated probabilities are presented in Table 20. There was a main effect for weapon,
F{5, 285) = 25.27, p  < .001, rj2 = .31, and a significant interaction for weapon and target, 
F(5, 285) = 3.80, p -  .002, r\2 = .06. There was no main effect for target.
An examination of the interaction (Figure 12) revealed that scenarios with 
government targets were judged as more probable than those with civilian targets, except 
for bomb scenarios and nuclear scenarios. Bomb scenarios with civilian targets were 
judged as more probable than those with government targets. Nuclear scenarios were
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judged equally probable across both targets. These results indicate that both weapon and 
target are important to the estimated probability of an attack occurring.
Table 20


























Note. Significant interactions for weapon x target, 
p < .05
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Figure 12




Note. “Bio” = biological; “Chem” = chemical; “Gun” = Firearm; “Nuke” = 
nuclear; “Rad” = radiological.
Subjective Evaluations, Event Features, Individual Characteristics, and Responses to 
Terrorism
Study 5 was designed to allow for a comparison of the impact of all three sets of
variables (event features, individual characteristics, and subjective evaluations) on
responses to terrorism events. Given that multiple observations were collected from each
participant, the best way to include all three types of variables in the same analysis was a
“clustered” least squares regression model. This analysis uses an inflated standard error
term that accounts for correlations among the five observations given by each participant
(Hamilton, 2006). This robust error term compensates for violating the assumption of
109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
independent observations required for traditional regression; however, because of the 
lack of independent observations, this analysis provides likelihood estimates for the 
sample b coefficients rather than the population ft coefficients (Hamilton, 2006). The type 
of weapon was entered as a series of dummy variables. Also, to maintain consistency 
with Study 3, the nuclear scenarios were omitted from these analyses.
Judgments o f severity. The clustered regression for judgments of severity— which 
evaluated the impact of all three sets of variables—is displayed in Table 21. Even after 
accounting for all other variables, type of weapon and type of target were significant 
predictors of severity judgments; these relationships were in the same direction as the 
ANOVAs discussed above. The only other predictor was interest in homeland security 
news, which was entered as an individual characteristic. In order for a mediating model to 
be considered, the mediator (subjective regressions) must predict the y-variable 
(judgments of severity) when all predictors are included in the model (Baron & Kenney, 
1986). Because the subjective evaluations did not predict of severity judgments in this 
regression, a mediating model was ruled out. This analysis showed that type of weapon, 
type of target, and interest in homeland security news were the significant predictors of 
participant’s judgments of severity.
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Table 21






Weapon: bio vs. bomb 2.71 1.58 1.72
Weapon: chem vs. bomb 7.56 1.92 3  9 3 ***
Weapon: gun vs. bomb 7.69 1.57 4  g9***
Weapon: rad vs. bomb 7.24 1.43 5.05***
Target 3.99 1.90 2 .1 0 *
Individual Characteristics
Gender .96 2 . 0 2 .48
Tolerance for terrorism - . 0 2 . 1 2 -.19
Attitudes toward terrorism .04 .06 .63
Interest in HLS news 1.44 .64 2.25*
Subjective Evaluation
Risk factor .57 .30 1.89
Knowledge factor -.14 .27 -.51
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. “bio” = biological; “chem” = 
chemical; “gun” = firearm; “nuke” = nuclear; “rad” = radiological; 
“HLS” = homeland security.
Communication. The clustered regression for communication responses— which 
evaluated the impact of event features, individual characteristics, and subjective 
evaluations—is displayed in Table 22. Even after accounting for all other variables, type 
of weapon and was a significant predictor of communication responses; these 
relationships mimic the ANOVAs discussed above. The only other predictor was interest 
in homeland security news, which was entered as an individual characteristic. The 
subjective evaluations were not significant predictors of communication responses;
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therefore, as with severity judgments, a mediating model was ruled out without further 
regression analyses (Baron & Kenney, 1986). This analysis showed that type of weapon 
and interest in homeland security news were the significant predictors of the extent to 
which participants would give and receive information about the scenarios.
Table 22






Weapon: bio vs. bomb .24 .75 .32
Weapon: chem vs. bomb 1.96 . 6 8 2.89**
Weapon: gun vs. bomb 1.59 .56 2.83**
Weapon: rad vs. bomb 1.43 .61 2.33*
Target -.89 . 8 8 - 1 . 0 1
Individual Characteristics
Gender .62 .83 .74
Tolerance for terrorism -.04 .04 -.95
Attitudes toward terrorism .03 .03 1.17
Interest in HLS news 1.24 .37 3.35**
Subjective Evaluation
Risk factor .19 .13 1.45
Knowledge factor -.23 .13 -1.78
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. “bio” = biological; “chem” = 
chemical; “gun” = firearm; “nuke” = nuclear; “rad” = radiological;
“HLS” = homeland security.
Estimated probability. The clustered regression for participants’ estimated
probability of occurring is displayed in Table 23. The subjective evaluations were not
included in this because the dependent variable itself was very similar to the danger
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
evaluations; therefore this regression model only evaluated the impact of event features 
and individual characteristics. Of the event features and individual characteristics entered 
into the regression, only type of weapon and interest in homeland security news were the 
significant predictors of estimates of probability. As with the above ANOVA, bomb 
attacks were had lower probability estimates than each other scenario. The probability 
estimates were positively related to interest in homeland security news, so that 
participants who scored higher in interest also produced higher probability estimates.
Table 23






Weapon: bio vs. bomb -6.75 3.13 -2.15*
Weapon: chem vs. bomb -12.24 3.12 -3 92***
Weapon: gun vs. bomb -10.14 2.94 -3.45**
Weapon: rad vs. bomb -7.94 3.29 -2.42*
Target 3.77 4.17 .90
Individual Characteristics
Gender 7.90 4.85 1.63
Tolerance for terrorism -.14 .24 -.61
Attitudes toward terrorism . 0 2 . 1 1 . 2 2
Interest in HLS news 4.28 1.41 3.03**
Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. “bio” = biological; “chem” = 
chemical; “gun” = firearm; “nuke” = nuclear; “rad” = radiological; 
“HLS” = homeland security.
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Discussion
Individual Characteristics and Responses to Terrorism
The Gender Hypothesis partially replicated the findings from Study 3. Women did 
have significantly higher fear responses to the scenarios, but there were no differences for 
anger. It is possible that leaving out references to victims may have masked gender 
differences. Also, Study 3 had a much larger number of participants, and therefore greater 
statistical power to detect gender differences.
The Communication Hypothesis did replicate the findings from Study 3 that fear 
was related to communication. This finding also supports Brown et al’s (2002) position 
that fear is related to media consumption. As discussed above, while no causal inference 
can be made, it does seem more likely that fear would lead to media consumption, 
because in these studies there was no actual media consumption that could increase the 
fear response. In this way these findings may actually inform a possible hypothesis to be 
evaluated in future research. The Tolerance Hypothesis not replicated the results from 
Study 3. Tolerance was not significantly related to anger or seriousness.
The discrepancies between these results and those presented in Study 3 are of 
interest. There were two primary differences between the two studies. First, Study 3 had 
250 participants, while Study 5 only had 60. Therefore Study 3 had greater statistical 
power to detect real effects. Second, the stimuli used in the two studies were not the 
same. Study 3 presented attack scenarios, while Study 5 presented threat scenarios. It is 
possible that this factor could change the relations among the variables measured here. 
Because Study 5 used threats rather than attack, there was also a difference in the 
information presented: no casualties or suicide conditions were specified. It is possible
114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that these differences could have lead to the discrepancies in the statistical results. These 
same factors may be relevant to other finding discrepancies reported below.
Individual Characteristics and Subjective Evaluations (Risk Hypothesis)
The psychometric literature has repeatedly identified underlying factors for 
subjective evaluations of hazards (Slovic, 1992). The factor analysis in Study 5 identified 
two factors: danger evaluations (included overall risk to U.S. population, personal risk, 
and catastrophic potential) and knowledge evaluations (included expert knowledge, 
knowledge of exposure, and control over consequences). The knowledge evaluations 
factor is consistent with previous psychometric studies (Slovic 1992; Slovic 2004). The 
other factor in Study 5, danger evaluations, does overlap with the “dread risk” factor 
identified in earlier studies, in that both factors include increasing risk, catastrophic 
potential. However, dread did not load onto this factor, nor was it related to responses to 
terrorism. It is not unusual, though, for psychometric studies dealing with specific 
hazards to identify different factors than those studies dealing with a more global list of 
hazards (Slovic et al., 1987).
The results here are generally consistent with the psychometric paradigm risk 
literature. It appears that subjective evaluations may offer an empirically driven method 
for mapping terrorist attacks in Euclidean space, which previous psychometric studies 
have done with larger groups of hazards (Fischhoff, et al., 2000; Slovic, 1992; Slovic et 
al., 1980/2000). Such taxonomy would be helpful for generalizing results for one type of 
terrorism to other types that may be perceived as similar.
The Risk Hypothesis in Study 5 was that the underlying “danger evaluations” and 
“knowledge evaluations” factors would be related to individual characteristics. This
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hypothesis was partially supported. Danger evaluations were related to fear of terrorism, 
but no other relations were significant for either factor. This is not consistent with 
previous studies which have found gender to be a strong predictor of risk perceptions 
(Slovic, 1999).
Event Features and Responses to Terrorism (Event Features Hypothesis)
Judgments o f severity. Study 5 found a weapon by target interaction for 
judgments of severity. Government targets were generally rated as more severe than were 
civilian targets. However, this was reversed for bomb scenarios, where civilian targets 
were rated as more severe. The effect of target depended on which level of weapon was 
being considered. The mechanism behind this change is unclear, but may be related to the 
emotional impact of previous bomb attacks. The bomb scenario results are consistent 
with Slovic and Bums (2006), who found that scenarios with civilian targets were judged 
as more serious. However, the other weapon-response patterns are not consistent with this 
previous study.
Communication. This variable also demonstrated a main effect for weapon. Bomb 
and biological scenarios had lower communication ratings than did all other scenarios. It 
is unclear why these pairwise comparisons demonstrated this pattern; this is the only case 
where bomb and biological scenarios showed similar responses that were also different 
from all others scenarios.
Estimated probability. This variable showed a weapon by target interaction, 
where government targets were judged as more likely than civilian targets for all 
scenarios except for bombings and nuclear attacks. Bomb scenarios were judged as more 
likely against civilian targets, and nuclear scenarios were judged as equally likely for
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both types of targets. The nuclear results make intuitive sense, because a nuclear attack 
covers such a wide area that its specific target is irrelevant. It is unclear why bomb 
scenarios were different from the other non-nuclear scenarios.
Event Features, Individual Characteristics, and Subjective Evaluations (Psychometric 
Hypothesis)
In addition to studying subjective evaluations alone, Study 5 was also designed to 
simultaneously examine the impact of event features and subjective evaluations on the 
dependent variables. The Psychometric Hypothesis was that these subjective evaluations 
would account for effects observed due to the event features.
The Psychometric Hypothesis was not confirmed. For each response variable, the 
impact of event features was still significant after accounting for subjective evaluations. 
It seems that subjective evaluations, while informative, should be studied in conjunction 
with event features.
The primary weakness of Study 5 is that the design is somewhat exploratory. The 
subjective characteristics were selected and included based on previous studies that did 
not deal with terrorism. Therefore some important subjective characteristics may have 
been omitted. A more comprehensive study could be done that included all subjective 
ratings previously studied, in order to evaluate which ones are important to the study of 
terrorism. Until such a study is done, this one provides a basis for future studies that 
prefer to look at a more select group of characteristics.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS
These five studies make substantial contributions to the understanding of 
terrorism attitudes. These studies investigated the following issues: the current emphasis 
on individual characteristics, the impact of event features, differences between 
responding to threats and responding to attacks, and the role of subjective evaluations to 
predict responses to terrorism. These issues currently missing from current terrorism 
attitudes research findings provide good starting points from which to begin a more 
thorough systematic investigation of terrorism attitudes.
Summary o f Basic Findings
Response Variables
These studies shed some empirical light on how to group responses to terrorism. 
The factor analysis from Study 3 showed that seriousness ratings could be grouped with 
harmfulness and disruptiveness ratings. This finding is useful for understanding how 
people conceptualize “seriousness.” Also, all four communication items loaded together, 
which is not surprising, and is helpful for understanding how to develop further survey 
items.
In the variety of analyses performed across Studies 3, 4, and 5, no one group of 
variables (event features, individual characteristics, and subjective evaluations) emerged
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as having the strongest association with response variables. Each group was important to 
understanding responses to terrorism, and their relative importance depended on both the 
scenario and response in question.
Event Features
One of the primary conclusions of these research studies is that the type of 
weapon used in a terrorist attack matters. In Studies 1 and 2, weapon was identified as a 
salient feature of terrorism events. In Study 3, weapon independently affected some 
responses to terrorism, and affected others in conjunction with the type of target. Study 3 
showed that the associations between individual characteristics and responses changed 
based on the type of weapon. These results indicate that weapon is an important 
consideration in responses to terrorism.
Within the event feature of weapon, several general points can be made. One is 
that responses to biological and chemical attacks rarely were significantly different, 
indicating that these attacks may be viewed as one type of weapon. Responses to nuclear 
scenarios, on the other hand, were always different from responses to all other attacks. 
Responses to bomb scenarios were usually different from responses to other attacks, but 
not always; the same is true of responses to the gunmen and radiological attacks. More 
research is needed before conclusions can be drawn about which attacks are like other 
attacks, and under what conditions.
The type of target was also an important event feature, although it did not have 
the same impact on responses that weapon did. In most of the analyses, the impact of 
target on response variables depended on the type of weapon. Likewise, when the 
presence of suicide was relevant, its impact depended on whether the scenario had a
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civilian or a government target. Both of these event features did impact response 
variables under certain circumstances.
Attacks vs. Threats
Threat condition (whether the scenario represented an attack or a threat) did 
interact with type of weapon in Study 4 for the response variable of communication. This 
was the only analysis where threats were explicitly different from attacks. However, the 
differences between the results from Study 3 and Study 5 could be a sign that threats are 
perceived and responded to differently than are attacks. One major discrepancy between 
these two studies was that in Study 3, bomb scenarios were consistently rated higher on 
severity; in Study 5, they were consistently rated lower on these responses. The results 
from these studies do not allow for a solid conclusion about responses to threats versus 
responses to attacks; future research endeavors should continue this line of investigation. 
Individual Characteristics
The individual characteristics used in these studies obviously represent only a 
small subset of all possible characteristics. However, several individual characteristics 
were consistently related to responses to terrorism. This research finding is consistent 
with a previous research finding (Hoffner et al., 2002; Snyder & Park, 2002; Stempel & 
Hargrove, 2002) that women reported higher fear responses, but not consistent with 
previous research findings that men demonstrated higher levels of anger (Hoffner et al., 
2002). The Attitudes Toward Terrorism Scale (including fear of terrorism and perceived 
risk of terrorism) was strongly related to all response variables.
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Subjective Evaluations
Subjective evaluations were only included in Study 5. Several of these evaluations 
loaded onto two factors, danger evaluations and knowledge evaluations. However, these 
factors were not related to responses to terrorism after accounting for certain event 
features and individual characteristics.
Implications
Implications for Previous Research
Individual characteristics. Previous research has tied many individual 
characteristics to responses to terrorism, such as age (Bleich et al, 2005; Ford, 2004; 
Miller & Heldring, 2004; Stempel & Hargrove, 2002; Wadsworth et al., 2004), gender 
(Hoffner et al., 2002; Shaw, 2003; Snyder & Park, 2002; Stempel & Hargrove, 2002), 
ethnicity (Miller & Heldring, 2004; Sprang, 2003), residential setting (Stempel & 
Hargrove, 2002), family characteristics (Miller & Heldring, 2004; Shaw, 2003), coping 
strategies (Knowlton, 2004; Sprang, 2003), social support structure (Miller & Heldring, 
2004; Shaw, 2003), communication patterns (Brown et al., 2002; Hoffner et al., 2002), 
personal history (Heldring, 2004; Muldoon, 2003; Shaw, 2003; Sprang, 2003), and media 
use (Brown et al., 2002; Dougall et al., 2005; Greenberg & Hofschire, 2002; Hoffner et 
al., 2002; Snyder & Park, 2002). Many of these could variables could not be addressed, 
because the sample lacked variability. However, this study does have some implications 
for gender and communication patterns.
In Study 3 and Study 5, women indicated a higher fear response than did men. 
This finding is consistent with previous research (Hoffner et al., 2002; Snyder & Park, 
2002; Stempel & Hargrove, 2002). However, in Study 3 women had a higher anger
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response than did men; this result is not consistent with previous research findings that 
men demonstrated higher levels of anger (Hoffner et al., 2002). These studies only 
partially support previous findings regarding gender and emotional responses to 
terrorism.
Previous research has identified links between patterns of communication and 
responses to terrorism. Hoffner et al. (2002) reported that contacting others about 9/11 
was positively related to fear, sadness, and anger. The results reported here support this 
conclusion, in that higher communication ratings were linked to higher fear responses. 
The causal direction of this association is uncertain. It is possible that levels o f  fear drive 
interpersonal communication, but it is also possible that communicating with others 
drives the fear response. While no causal conclusions can be made, a causal hypothesis 
can be constructed for future research. Because the studies presented here did not ask 
about actual communication, but only about estimated communication, it is unlikely that 
the communication drove the fear response. It is more likely that the fear response may 
lead to higher estimates of communication, especially because in this study the fear 
responses were obtained prior to the communication responses. This hypothesis could be 
directly investigated in future studies.
Event features. Previous researchers have suggested that event features such as 
type of weapon (Long, 2002), number of victims (Long, 1990; Sprang, 2003), known 
cause (Sprang, 2003), motivation (Cronin, 2002), and presence of suicide (Pape, 2005) 
impact responses to terrorism. An empirical study by Slovic and Bums (2006) verified 
that type of weapon, presence of suicide, and motive were related to responses to
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
terrorism scenarios, but that number of victims was not. Slovic and Bums also found that 
type of target was a predictor of responses.
The current findings support previous research suggesting that type of weapon, 
type of target, and presence of suicide are all related to responses to terrorism. They also 
support Slovic and Bum’s (2006) finding that the number of victims did not impact 
responses to terrorism, even though this feature was previously posited to be important 
(Long, 1990; Sprang, 2003). Unlike Slovic and Bum’s study, which did not address the 
interactions of event features, the current findings revealed several interaction, suggesting 
that the impact of some event features depends on others.
Subjective evaluations. In previous studies of subjective evaluations, two 
underlying factors have been consistently (though not exclusively) identified— dread 
risk, which is associated with lack of control, dreaded consequences, catastrophic 
potential, inequitable distribution, increasing risk, and fatal consequences; and unknown 
risk, which is associated with unobservability, novelty, unknown exposure, unknown to 
science, and delayed consequences (Slovic, 1992; Slovic, 2004). Two other factors have 
also been identified in individual studies: number of people exposed (Slovic et al., 
1980/2000), and severity of consequences (Fischhoff et al., 2000). The consistent finding, 
however, is that the factor dread risk has been the best predictor of the overall perceived 
risk of a hazard
The factors identified in Study 5 were similar to the ones described above. The 
knowledge evaluations factor in Study 5 consisted of several of the same evaluations 
found in previous studies; the danger evaluations factor from Study 5 contained a subset
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of the evaluations normally found in the dread factor from previous studies (Slovic,
1992; Slovic 2004).
The major discrepancy in Study 5 was that dread was not an important variable 
for responses to terrorism, as it has been in previous studies (Fischhoff et al., 2000; 
Slovic, 1992, Slovic, 2004; Slovic et al., 1979/2000; Slovic et al., 1980/2000). This 
difference is most likely due to the fact that these previous studies dealt with diverse 
hazards, while Study 5 dealt only with terrorism hazards. Previous psychometric studies 
using specific hazards have also identified different factors, including the number of 
people exposed (Slovic et al., 1980/2000) and the severity of consequences (Fischhoff et 
al., 2000). In fact, the psychometric paradigm predicts that the most relevant subjective 
evaluations will vary depending on the hazards under consideration (Slovic, 1987; Slovic, 
1992).
Given the flexibility of the psychometric paradigm in dealing with various 
hazards, the findings from Study 5 seem to complement rather than contradict previous 
research. It is logical to conclude that dread is not an important factor for responses to 
terrorism and that overall level of risk is relevant to responses to terrorism. However, 
because this is the first study applying the psychometric paradigm to terrorism hazards, 
these conclusions should undergo replication in future research.
Implications for Government Agencies
Based on the previous and current studies discussed above, several 
recommendations can be made for those directly involved in homeland security, 
emergency preparedness, and disaster recovery. These recommendations are purposely 
general, because the specifics of how to implement them will vary from one context to
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another. This list is not intended to be exhaustive; surely other recommendations can be 
made, again based on a specific context. The following do provide, however, a 
framework within which to apply the research discussed here.
One important finding from this research was that communication patterns will 
differ for different terrorism events. The public will have varied desires and expectations 
for information about the event. For agencies tasked with providing this information, the 
following issues should be considered.
It is essential for an organization to build trust with its constituents. Researchers 
have found trust in sources of information to be an important factor for public perceptions 
(Johnson & Slovic, 1995; Seguin et al., 1999; Sjoberg, 1999). Without trust, any 
information from that organization will likely be discounted, including information about 
levels of safety, disaster scenarios, or evacuation procedures. One important aspect of 
gaining and/or maintaining trust is to make the successes of an organization as visible as 
possible. This task is more difficult than it sounds, because the failures of any 
organization are generally more apparent and noticeable than are its successes (Slovic, 
1999). In some cases, particularly with intelligence organizations, successes cannot be 
shared with the public because such information may compromise future efforts. But it is 
essential that agencies involved with homeland security have proactive campaigns 
designed to build trust with the public by actively communicating information favorable 
to the agency. Agencies can also build trust in the way that they deal with failures. Open 
communication about the cause of a failure, and steps being taken to prevent another, can 
and should be used to rebuild trust after an agency fails to meet its responsibilities.
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A psychological phenomenon that naturally inhibits trust is hindsight bias, or the 
“I-knew-it-all-along” phenomenon. Once an event has occurred, observers tend to 
overestimate the predictability of the event. This phenomenon means that failures are not 
only more noticeable, they are considered to be inexcusable, especially failures of 
foresight. From the public’s perspective, any catastrophe or disaster could have been 
avoided, because there was sufficient evidence beforehand that it was going to occur. 
From an agency’s perspective, the evidence predicting an event was buried within the 
evidence against the event occurring, and thus no foresight was possible. Agencies, and 
especially their press liaisons, must be aware of this difference in perspective and be 
ready to publicly account for it.
Agencies must also offer specific information whenever possible. This point is 
particularly salient for organizations tasked with motivating people to take action. People 
tend to ignore general instructions that do not include specific actions (Heldring, 2004; 
Stout, 2004). Of course, the actions requested must also be sensible to the public, or even 
specifics will be ignored. Therefore agencies must not only provide specific instructions, 
but give detailed (and simple) reasons for those instructions. Specific information is also 
needed for warnings (Barnett & Breakwell, 2003). As discussed above, the color-coded 
system is largely useless to the general population because of its lack of specificity. If 
details cannot be given, the agency must consider whether releasing general instructions 
or warnings will actually cause harm to their communication efforts, either through 
creating distrust among the public, or through desensitizing their audience to such 
communication. In some cases, it may actually be advisable to present no information 
rather than to present information that the audience cannot use.
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A second important finding from the current studies is that different terrorism 
events lead to different perceptions of severity. As the public perceives one event to be 
more severe than another, it will naturally place greater important on preventing and/or 
managing that event. Thus various public priorities will emerge, and these priorities must 
be understood by government agencies tasked with emergency preparedness.
In cases of general homeland security or emergency preparedness issues, public 
opinion polls can offer a basic level of insight. In more specific cases, some level of 
primary research—such as the studies conducted here—may need to be conducted in 
order to identify priorities. Once an organization can understand the perspective (and thus 
the priorities) of its constituents, they are better prepared to address those priorities. Often 
an agency is already addressing these priorities, and it simply needs to do a better job of 
communicating these efforts to the public. In other cases the public priorities may need to 
be altered; this is a very difficult thing to do, but it is possible if the issues of trust and 
specificity have already been addressed. If an agency does find it necessary to conduct a 
campaign to alter the public priorities, awareness of public priorities will inform decision 
makers of the progress of such a campaign.
A third important implication for government agencies is that public perceptions 
should be incorporated into scenario development exercises. Scenario development will 
be more accurate if the subjective features of a threat are included along with the 
objective features. Of course, the impact of these subjective features is still a matter of 
ongoing research, especially in the area of terrorism, so such a process would necessarily 
be iterative. DHS is beginning to include evaluative responses in its modeling programs 
(R. G. Ross, Deputy Director, Office of Comparative Studies, personal communication,
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July 25, 2006), and such efforts should be noticed and applied by local preparedness 
agencies. As this information is incorporated into the current knowledge and accounted 
for in predictive models, it should allow for a more sophisticated and accurate prediction 
of actual behaviors.
A fourth implication for government agencies is the ability to map the results 
discussed above onto the Health Belief Model from the field of health psychology 
literature. The Health Belief Model emphasizes that health decisions are based on 
perceptions of benefits and barriers as well as perceptions of threat; these two perceptions 
are in turn dependent on individual characteristics such as demographics and previous 
exposure, beliefs about susceptibility and the seriousness of exposure, as well as cues to 
action such as doctor’s advice or the prodding of friends and family (Sarafino, 2002).
This model has been effective as a basis for designing educational programs for certain 
diseases, such as AIDS. Given the findings from these studies that individual 
characteristics, event features, and perceptions are related to responses to terrorism, it is 
likely that similar programs could be developed to better inform the public about the risks 
of and proper responses to terrorism events.
Limitations
Sample Limitations
One of the major limitations of these studies was the undergraduate sample. Using 
an undergraduate sample from UNH limited the variability for most of the individual 
characteristics that have been important in other studies, such age, geographical 
residence, and ethnicity. Using the undergraduate sample also limits the generalizability
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of the results. In order for these results to be safely generalized to the American public, 
they should be replicated on a community sample.
Procedural Limitations
Several limitations emerged from the procedures followed in these studies. First, 
the scenarios used were hypothetical. While using hypothetical scenarios allowed the 
degree of control and manipulation needed for the studies, it is likely that responses to the 
scenarios would have been much stronger and more nuanced given an actual event. 
Therefore differences in responses among scenarios may have been masked, decreasing 
the ability of the analyses to reject the null hypotheses.
Another procedural limitation was that the scenarios used were non-random. 
Because the scenarios were selected a priori, and were not a random sample from the 
population of terrorist scenarios, it is not possible to generalize these findings to events 
not included in the stimuli. However, it is doubtful that such a random sample could be 
obtained, given that the population of terrorist events is continually expanding. It is likely 
that future studies will have the same limitation, though perhaps not to the same degree.
Another procedural limitation was that the attitude measures were collected in the 
same sitting as were the response measures. While the attitude measures were not 
collected in association with any particular stimuli, the participants were exposed to the 
stimuli some time prior to completing the attitude measures. It is therefore possible that 
the scenarios themselves could have affected the attitude measures.
Also, the stimuli were presented to all participants in a specific order, and not 
randomized. However, one group of participants was given the stimuli in reverse order to 
check for this effect. These participants did not differ significantly on the response
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variables. However, it is possible that other order effects existed within the two orders 
employed for these studies.
Analysis Limitations
Two main limitations affected the analyses. One was that the type of weapon was 
a within-subjects variable. This constrained the type of regression that could be used, 
because the assumption of independent observations was violated. A clustered regression 
was able to partially overcome this limitation, but it was not able to provide an estimate 
of population parameters, as would a regular regression.
The second limitation was that the response measures that could be used as 
dependent variables were limited by non-normal distributions. For example,
“seriousness” was a response measure, and provided a good global evaluation of each 
scenario. However, this measure showed a bimodal distribution with a strong ceiling 
effect, and was not able to be analyzed with parametric analyses. Through the factor 
analysis reported in Study 3, this measure was combined with measures of 
“disruptiveness” and “harmfulness” to produce more normally distributed responses. 
While this combination of variables allowed for standard parametric techniques, it also 
made the resulting dependent variable, “judgments of severity,” more specific and less 
global than was originally sought. Therefore the results could not be directly compared to 
previous studies (e.g. Slovic & Bums, under review) which used the more global measure 
of seriousness. Other minor response variables, such as some of the emotional reactions, 
were completely left out of the analyses for lack of variability among participants. Also, 
in both Study 3 and Study 5, certain scenarios had to be excluded from analyses due to 
ceiling effects.
130
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There are several possible reasons for these distributions. First, it is plausible that 
responses to terrorism are not normally distributed, and responses to extreme events will 
tend to show bimodality, ceiling effect, or lack of variance. However, many other studies 
have studied responses to terrorism with standard parametric techniques, and evidently 
they do not come across these issues on a regular basis (or they use extensive data 
treatments without reporting them). Another reason may be that the hypothetical 
scenarios constrained the natural variability in responses. People will not have the same 
breadth of response to a manufactured stimulus on a page as to an actual event with real 
consequences (and a lot more information than was offered in the survey). Yet another 
reason, also mentioned previously, could be the relatively homogenous sample of New 
England undergraduates. Whatever the cause, the distributions of some of the response 
variables limited their use in the analyses.
Future Directions
The studies presented here, while somewhat exploratory, offer a strong foundation 
to continue terrorism attitudes research. Several directions can and should be taken by 
future research. First, the impact of event features should be further explored. Because of 
the number of features that can be manipulated, and the number of levels of many of 
them, there are a multitude of main effects and interactions that can be explored. These 
studies focus on a few, but future studies could systematically control and manipulate 
various characteristics, and in this way develop a descriptive taxonomy of which terrorist 
attacks are considered most serious, or most likely, or most preventable, or most 
catastrophic, etc. Unfortunately such taxonomy might be greatly impacted by world 
events, and would have to be periodically verified and updated. But it would be a useful
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database of stimuli with which to conduct terrorism attitude research. It would also 
provide cognitive researchers with a means to delineate schemas associated with 
terrorism events.
Another direction for future research would be to use historical terrorist attacks, 
media coverage, and public opinion polls to attempt to historically verify the findings of 
the current studies. Such research would present its own methodological challenges due 
to dealing with missing information, operationalizing concepts, and quantifying data. 
However, such research would offer a valuable real-world confirmation and application 
of the principles that have been studied here with hypothetical scenarios.
Using similar designs as those presented here, personality researchers could focus 
exclusively on individual variables that are related to reactions to terrorism. This research 
only examined a handful of possible individual and response variables. Larger designs 
could accommodate a great number of personality variables such as the classic Big Five, 
and investigate which of these are most predictive of responses to terrorism. In a 
historical context, personality researchers could examine leaders who have become 
prominent in countries or regions most affected by terrorism, to determine if they share 
common qualities.
Future research could also examine the cyclical relationship between responses to 
terrorism and some of the attitude measures examined here (fear of terrorism, perceived 
risk of terrorism, tolerance for terrorism, etc.). These attitudes are almost certainly 
impacted by previous responses to terrorism, and they certainly do impact responses to 
threatened and actual terrorism events. The nature of this relationship should be 
examined and described in future studies.
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Future researchers should also seek to develop more realistic stimuli for these 
types of studies. There has always been and will always be a trade-off between realism 
and control in the social sciences, but creative researchers have often made significant 
breakthroughs by maximizing both of these attributes. Some possible methods of using 
more realistic scenarios could be the development of more detailed scenarios that only 
vary on the desired features. (More detailed scenarios could not be used in the present 
studies due to the fact that each participant received five stimuli, and if they were too 
detailed and still very similar, the stimuli would not have been believable.) Also, video 
segments could be produced and used as the stimuli, including segments of newscasts of 
actual events that the participants would not be familiar with (perhaps obscure events 
from foreign countries). It would take some effort to use such stimuli and still maintain 
experimental control, but the payoff would be substantial in terms of understanding how 
people respond to terrorism.
Concluding Remarks 
Terrorism, while historically ubiquitous, has recently become a singular political 
and cultural force, both in the U.S. and across the globe. Public attitudes toward terrorism 
have become a driving force behind U.S. domestic and foreign policy. It is vitally 
important that social scientists and government agencies develop a proper understanding 
of these attitudes, including the impact of individual characteristics, event features, and 
subjective evaluations. The studies presented here represent a significant advancement in 
that understanding, while laying the groundwork for future research endeavors.
The threat of terrorism is transforming politics and societies on a global scale. The 
importance of these studies is that they examine responses toward both past and future
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terrorism, and that they tie those attitudes to features and perceptions of the events, as 
well as to features of the person. Such research is important socially and politically, as it 
can describe and predict public priorities, and suggest more effective ways of dealing 
with public concerns about risk and safety.
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APPENDIX A
STIMULI FROM STUDY 1
1. U.S. Ambassador to Sudan and other diplomats are assassinated at the Saudi Arabian 
Embassy in Khartoum by members of the Black September organization.
2. Five terrorists pull weapons from their luggage in the terminal lounge at the Rome 
airport, killing two persons. They then attack a Pan American 707 bound for Beirut 
and Tehran, destroying it with incendiary grenades and killing 29 persons, including 4 
senior Moroccan officials and 14 American employees of ARAMCO. They then herd 
5 Italian hostages into a Lufthansa airliner and kill an Italian customs agent as he tries 
to escape, after which they force the pilot to fly to Beirut. After Lebanese authorities 
refuse to let the plane land, it lands in Athens, where the terrorists demand the release 
of 2 Arab terrorists. In order to make Greek authorities comply with their demands, 
the terrorists kill a hostage and throw his body onto the tarmac. The plane then flies to 
Damascus, where it stops for two hours to obtain fuel and food. It then flies to 
Kuwait, where the terrorists release their hostages in return for passage to an 
unknown destination.
3. Puerto Rican nationalists bomb a Wall Street bar, killing four and injuring 60.
4. Members of the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) seize an Air France airliner and its 258 passengers. They force the 
plane to land in Uganda. On July 3 Israeli commandos successfully rescue the 
passengers.
5. 200 Islamic terrorists seize the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, taking 
hundreds of pilgrims hostage. Saudi and French security forces retake the shrine after 
an intense battle in which some 250 people are killed and 600 wounded.
6 . Three American nuns and one lay missionary are found murdered outside San 
Salvador, El Salvador. They were killed by members of the National Guard, and the 
killers are currently in prison.
7. A U.S. citizen is seized by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
held for ransom.
8 . Sixty-three people, including the CIA's Middle East director, are killed and 120 are 
injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, 
Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad claim responsibility.
9. Eighteen U.S. servicemen are killed and 83 people are injured in a bomb attack on a 
restaurant near a U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain.
10. Sikh terrorists seize the Golden Temple in Amritsar, India. One hundred people die 
when Indian security forces retake the Sikh holy shrine.
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11. A Trans-World Airlines flight is hijacked en route to Rome from Athens by two 
Lebanese Hizballah terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut. The eight crew members and 
145 passengers are held for seventeen days, during which one American hostage, a 
U.S. Navy sailor, is murdered. After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft is 
returned to Beirut after Israel releases 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners.
12. A bomb destroys an Air India Boeing 747 over the Atlantic, killing all 329 people 
aboard. Both Sikh and Kashmiri terrorists are blamed for the attack.
13. Four Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists seize the Italian cruise liner in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea, taking more than 700 hostages. One U.S. passenger is murdered 
before the Egyptian government offered the terrorists safe haven in return for the 
hostages' freedom.
14. Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization attack the El A1 and Trans 
World Airlines ticket counters at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport with grenades 
and automatic rifles. Thirteen persons are killed and 75 are wounded before Italian 
police and Israeli security guards kill three of the gunmen and captured the fourth.
15. Pan American Airlines Flight 103 is blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb 
believed to have been placed on the aircraft by Libyan terrorists in Frankfurt, West 
Germany. All 259 people on board are killed.
16. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement bombs the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru.
17. Three Red Army Faction members fire automatic rifles from across the Rhine River 
at the U.S. Embassy Chancery. No one is hurt.
18. Two U.S. businessmen are seized independently by the National Liberation Army and 
by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
19. Hizballah claims responsibility for a blast that levels the Israeli Embassy in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, causing the deaths of 29 and wounding 242.
20. Jewish right-wing extremist and U.S. citizen Baruch Goldstein machine-gun Moslem 
worshippers at a mosque in West Bank town of Hebron, killing 29 and wounding 
about 150.
21. FARC rebels kidnap U.S. citizen Thomas Hargrove in Colombia.
22. Twelve persons are killed and 5,700 are injured in a Sarin nerve gas attack on a 
crowded subway station in the center of Tokyo, Japan. A similar attack occurs nearly 
simultaneously in the Yokohama subway system. The Aum Shinri-kyo cult is blamed 
for the attacks.
23. A rocket-propelled grenade is fired through the window of the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow, ostensibly in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Serb positions in Bosnia.
24. A suicide bomber drives a vehicle into the Egyptian Embassy compound in 
Islamabad, Pakistan, killing at least 16 and injuring 60 persons. Three militant Islamic 
groups claim responsibility.
25. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas kidnap a US citizen and 
demand a $1 million ransom. The hostage is released.
26. Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ram an explosives-laden 
truck into the Central Bank in the heart of downtown Colombo, Sri Lanka, killing 90 
civilians and injuring more than 1,400 others, including 2 US citizens.
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27. Unidentified assailants fire a rocket at the U.S. Embassy compound in Athens, 
causing minor damage to three diplomatic vehicles and some surrounding buildings. 
Circumstances of the attack suggest it was an operation carried out by the 17 
November group.
28. In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber blows up a bus, killing 26 persons, including three 
U.S. citizens, and injuring some 80 persons, including three other US citizens.
29. HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) both claim responsibility for a bombing 
outside of Tel Aviv's largest shopping mall that killed 20 persons and injured 75 
others, including 2 U.S. citizens.
30. A gang of former Contra guerrillas kidnap a U.S. employee of the Agency for 
International Development (AID) who was assisting with election preparations in 
rural northern Nicaragua. She is released unharmed the next day after members of the 
international commission overseeing the preparations intervene.
31. An IRA truck bomb detonates at a Manchester shopping center, wounding 206 
persons, including two German tourists, and cause extensive property damage.
32. A bomb explodes at the home of the French Archbishop of Oran, killing him and his 
chauffeur. The attack occurs after the Archbishop's meeting with the French Foreign 
Minister. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is suspected.
33. In Vladivostok, Russia, assailants attack and kill a South Korean consul near his 
home. No one claims responsibility, but South Korean authorities believe that the 
attack was carried out by professionals and that the assailants were North Koreans. 
North Korean officials deny the country's involvement in the attack.
34. A bomb explodes aboard a Paris subway train as it arrives at the Port Royal station, 
killing two French nationals, a Moroccan, and a Canadian, and injuring 8 6  persons. 
Among those injured are one U.S. citizen and a Canadian. No one claims 
responsibility for the attack, but Algerian extremists are suspected.
35. A series of letter bombs with Alexandria, Egypt, postmarks are discovered at Al- 
Hayat newspaper bureaus in Washington, New York City, London, and Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia. Three similar devices, also postmarked in Egypt, are found at a prison 
facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. Bomb disposal experts defuse all the devices, but 
one detonates at the Al-Hayat office in London, injuring two security guards and 
causing minor damage.
36. A Palestinian gunman opens fire on tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire 
State Building in New York City, killing a Danish national and wounding visitors 
from the United States, Argentina, Switzerland, and France before turning the gun on 
himself. A handwritten note carried by the gunman claims this is a punishment attack 
against the "enemies of Palestine."
37. National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas kidnap a U.S. citizen employed by a Las 
Vegas gold corporation who is scouting a gold mining operation in Colombia. The 
ELN demand a ransom of $2.5 million.
38. Al-Sha'if tribesmen kidnap a U.S. businessman near Sanaa. The tribesmen seek the 
release of two fellow tribesmen who were arrested on smuggling charges and several 
public works projects they claim the government promised them. They later release 
the hostage.
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39. A UN plane carrying one U.S. citizen, four Angolans, two Philippine nationals and 
one Namibian is shot down, according to a UN official. No deaths or injuries are 
reported. Angolan authorities blame the attack on National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. UNITA officials deny shooting down the 
plane.
40. A bomb explosion destroys UTA Flight 772 over the Sahara Desert in southern Niger 
during a flight from Brazzaville to Paris. All 170 persons aboard are killed. Six 
Libyans are later found guilty in absentia and sentenced to life imprisonment.
41. North Korean agents plant a bomb aboard Korean Air Lines Flight 858, which 
subsequently crashes into the Indian Ocean.
42. A bomb destroys the Baghdad office of the Supreme Council of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq, killing a woman and wounding at least 7 other persons.
43. A female suicide bomber kills 5 other persons and wounds 14 outside Moscow's 
National Hotel. She is said to be looking for the State Duma.
44. Grenade attacks on two bars frequented by Americans in Bogota kill one person and 
wounded 72, including 4 Americans. Colombian authorities suspect FARC (the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The U.S. Embassy suspect that the 
attacks targeted Americans and warn against visiting commercial centers and places 
of entertainment.
45. Two suicide truck bombs explode outside the Neve Shalom and Beth Israel 
synagogues in Istanbul, killing 25 persons and wounding at least 300 more. The 
initial claim of responsibility comes from a Turkish militant group, the Great Eastern 
Islamic Raiders' Front, but Turkish authorities suspect an al-Qaeda connection. The 
next day, the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi receives an e-mail in which 
an al-Qaeda branch called the Brigades of the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri claimes 
responsibility for the Istanbul synagogue bombings.
46. In Riyadh, a suicide car bombing takes place in the Muhaya residential compound, 
which is occupied mainly by nationals of other Arab countries. Seventeen persons are 
killed and 122 are wounded. The latter includes 4 Americans. The next day, Deputy 
Secretary of State Armitage says al-Qaeda ;s probably responsible.
47. A suicide car bomb attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad kills a security guard 
and wounds 19 other persons.
48. A suicide bombing aboard a bus in Jerusalem kills 20 persons and injures at least 100, 
one of whom dies later. Five of the dead are American citizens. HAMAS and Islamic 
Jihad claim responsibility, although HAMAS leader al-Rantisi says that his 
organization remains committed to the truce while reserving the right to respond to 
Israeli military actions.
49. A car bomb explodes outside a night club in Bogota, Colombia, killing 32 persons 
and wounding 160. No group claims responsibility, but Colombian officials suspect 
the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).
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APPENDIX B
STIMULI FROM STUDY 2
1. Terrorists might poison water reservoirs
2. Terrorists might detonate bombs in a subway
3. Terrorists might disrupt elections with polling place snipers
4. Terrorists might fire rockets towards the White House from a van roof
5. Terrorists might poison Starbucks Coffee
6 . Terrorists might detonate a subterranean nuclear weapon
7. Terrorists might do a 50-state simultaneous mall bombing
8 . Terrorists might Bomb Union Station with a suitcase bomb
9. Terrorists might create and spread a debilitating computer virus
10. Terrorists might irradiate a vital economic area with a radioactive bomb.
11. Terrorists might poison the water misters at an amusement park
12. Terrorists might detonate grenades in a crowded sports stadium
13. Terrorists might use knives for coordinated attacks on civilians
14. Terrorists might shoot the ultra-high tension power transformers
15. Terrorists might incapacitate offshore drilling rigs in the Gulf of Mexico
16. Terrorists might poison communion at churches
17. Terrorists might dump a bag of broken light bulbs over Times Square on New Years 
Eve
18. Terrorists might create a hostage situation at the New York Stock Exchange or other 
vital economic location
19. Terrorists might hijack the Emergency Broadcast System and initiate a public panic 
with false information
20. Terrorists might simultaneously incapacitate the four east-west interstate highway 
arteries
21. Terrorists might use suicide bombers in Walmart or some other shopping center
22. Terrorists might release poison gas in forced ventilation skyscrapers
23. Terrorists might attack a crowded indoor arena with toxic gases in the air 
conditioning
24. Terrorists might pose as a bus driver and drive a full bus off a cliff
25. Terrorist might send out misinformation that several food products have been 
poisoned
26. Terrorists might detonate a dirty nuke briefcase bomb at the Capitol building
27. Terrorists might plant viruses in the computer systems of powerplants
28. Terrorists might spread a biological weapon at a large airport hub
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29. Terrorists might storm the White House with 200 well armed and defended terrorists
30. Terrorists might infect people on a few international flights with smallpox
31. Terrorists might bulldoze the bleachers at a sports arena
32. Terrorists might use a potato gun to launch C4 explosives at the White House
33. Terrorists might plant land mines
34. Terrorists might plant land mines on bike path
35. Terrorists might go on a state fair shooting spree
36. Terrorists might isolate a large city by incapacitating its transportation routes.
37. Terrorists might detonate bombs at dozens of shopping malls nationwide
38. Terrorists might bomb a cruise ship far from help
39. Terrorists might use armored machinegun attackers at a Halloween street festival
40. Terrorists might try contamination of over-the-counter drugs
41. Terrorists might shoot the pilot or crewmember of an airplane while it is docked at a 
gate
42. Terrorists might conceal a bomb on a plane by shipping a concealed package
43. Terrorists might use chemicals or sharp objects to destroy priceless art treasures
44. Terrorists might bulk-mail millions of small incendiary devices
45. Terrorists might crash automobile simultaneously around the country on major roads 
at msh hour
46. Terrorists might hold hostage the patrons of a movie theater on a crowded opening 
weekend
47. Terrorists might activate an electronic satellite jamming system to disrupt surface-to- 
satellite communications
48. Terrorists might attack the US with one of the former USSR's unsecured nukes
49. Terrorists might use bombs to destroy a large prominent college or university
50. Terrorists might plant explosives on traffic light boxes.
51. Terrorists might use a fertilizer truck to blow up a major bridge
52. Terrorists might blow up a truck while driving over a bridge at the mouth of a busy 
port.
53. Terrorists might use virus-laden perfume bottles to infect a sports arena
54. Terrorists might bring down the Internet and all connected computers with a 
computer virus
55. Terrorists might crash a plane at the intersection of 1-75 and 1-80 (or some other 
major interchange)
56. Terrorists might use explosives to destroy the intake of a large hydroelectric plant
57. Terrorists might blow all of the bridges and tunnels into and from the island of 
Manhattan
58. Terrorists might infect water supply with AIDS virus
59. Terrorists might switch flu vaccines with smallpox injections
60. Terrorists might detonate a dirty nuke RV in the infield area at the Daytona 500
61. Terrorists might park cars on train tracks
62. Terrorists might use a truck bomb in the parking garage basement of an important 
building
63. Terrorists might poison a food additive that is used to produce a variety of food items
64. Terrorists might try cross-country coordinated truck-bombs on bridges
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65. Terrorists might destroy high capacity power lines in rural areas
6 6 . Terrorists might kill the heads of several major companies
67. Terrorists might contaminate U.S. currency
6 8 . Terrorists might rig all the bridges over a major river with explosives and detonate 
them during rush hour.
69. Terrorists might spray anthrax on fresh produce in supermarkets
70. Terrorists might poison McDonald’s beef products
71. Terrorists might call in bomb scares at major train stations and airports
72. Terrorists might kidnap random civilians and publicize their beheading videos
73. Terrorists might detonate a tanker truck underneath an overpass, blocking two 
highways
74. Terrorists might overload the 911 emergency system
75. Terrorists might launch small shoulder mounted missiles at passenger airplanes
76. Terrorists might try suicide collisions in 100 stolen cars
77. Terrorists might cause car accidents by seeding freeways with nails
78. Terrorists might call in bomb scares at major train stations and airpors
79. Terrorists might destroy farm irrigation equipment
80. Terrorists might attach bombs to skyscraper support columns
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APPENDIX C
STIMULI FROM STUDY 3
Biological Attacks
A suicide attacker [An attacker] exposes people in a shopping plaza [in the State 
Capitol building/on a city bus] to smallpox. Several [dozen] people die from the disease, 
along with the attacker [but the attacker escapes].
Bomb Attacks
A suicide bomber [A bomber] detonates a bomb inside a shopping plaza [inside 
the State Capitol building/on a city bus]. Several [dozen] people are killed. [The bomber 
escapes.]
Chemical Attacks
A  suicide attacker [An attacker] releases sarin gas inside a shopping plaza [inside 
the State Capitol building/on a city bus]. Several [dozen] people in the immediate vicinity 
are killed. [The attacker escapes].
Firearm Attacks
Gunmen burst into a shopping plaza [burst into the State Capitol building/on a 
city bus] and gun down several [dozen] people before shooting themselves [before 
escaping].
Radiological Attacks
A  suicide bomber [A bomber] detonates a “dirty bomb” which releases radiation 
into a shopping plaza [into the State Capitol building/on a city bus]. Several [dozen] 
people die from radiation poisoning. [The bomber escapes.]
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APPENDIX D
MEASURES FROM STUDIES 3-5
1. People respond in a variety of ways to terrorist attacks. How much of the following 
emotions would you experience, if this attack actually happened?
None A little
a. Fear 1 2
b. Excitement 1 2
c. Anger 1 2
d. Happiness I 2
e. Anxiety 1 2
f. Confidence 1 2
g. Contempt 1 2
h. Surprise 1 2
i. Satisfaction 1 2
j. Frustration 1 2
3 4 5 6
A lot 
7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
2. If this actually happened, do you think it would be a serious attack? (circle one)
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how serious it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SLIGHTLY MODERATELY EXTREMELY
SERIOUS SERIOUS SERIOUS
3. If this actually happened, do you think it would be harmful to the other people in that 
areal
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how harmful it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
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4. Would this attack be harmful to the U.S. population as a whole? (circle one)
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how harmful it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SLIGHTLY MODERATELY EXTREMELY
HARMFUL HARMFUL HARMFUL
5. If this actually happened, do you think it would be disruptive to the daily activities of 
the other people in that areal
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how disruptive it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SLIGHTLY MODERATELY EXTREMELY
DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE
6 . Would this attack be disruptive to the daily activities of the U.S. population as a 
wholel
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how disruptive it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SLIGHTLY MODERATELY EXTREMELY
DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE
7. Would this attack be disruptive to the local government’s daily activities?
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how disruptive it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SLIGHTLY MODERATELY EXTREMELY
DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE
8 . Would this attack be disruptive to the federal government’s activities?
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how disruptive it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
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9. Would this attack be disruptive to your daily activities?
0. No 1. Yes
If you marked “Yes,” please indicate how disruptive it would be (if “No,” skip this 
question):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SLIGHTLY MODERATELY EXTREMELY
DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE DISRUPTIVE
10. Assuming that we knew who was responsible for this attack, how supportive would 
you be of the following responses which the U.S. government might engage in? (please 
circle a number)
Not at all Somewhat Extremely
supportive supportive supportive
Military response 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Diplomatic respons 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. If this attack actually happened, how much would you pay attention to news stories 
about the attack?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_ . some all myno attention attention attention
12. If this attack actually happened, how much information would you seek out about the 
attack?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
no some all available
information information information
13. If this attack actually happened, how much would you be willing to talk about it with 
others?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I would not be T ....  ^  ^ n I would be.... , , „ „ I would be willing to talk .... ..willing to talk at , f  willing to talk„ somewhat ,, , .all all the time
14. If this attack actually happened, how much would you actively try to talk to others 
about it?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I would not try to I would try to talk I would try to
talk at all somewhat talk all the time
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15. What is the likelihood of this attack actually occurring in the U.S. during the next two 
years? Please assign a number between 0 and 100, where 0 means that it DEFINITELY 
WON’T HAPPEN, and 100 means that it DEFINITELY WILL HAPPEN_________
Please rate the scenarios based on how serious they would be, where 
1 = MOST SERIOUS, and 5 = LEAST SERIOUS.
(Condition: non-suicide, civilian target, low casualties)
76 .______An attacker exposes people in a shopping plaza to smallpox. Several people
die from the disease, but the attacker escapes.
77 .______An attacker releases poisonous gas inside a shopping plaza. Several people in
the immediate vicinity are killed. The attacker escapes.
78 .______Gunmen burst into a shopping plaza and gun down several people before
escaping.
79. _ ____ A bomber detonates a bomb inside a shopping plaza. Several people in the
immediate vicinity are killed. The bomber escapes.
80 .______A bomber detonates a “dirty bomb” which releases radiation into a shopping
plaza. Several people die from radiation poisoning. The bomber escapes.
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A. Please rate the following statements on the 6 point scale provided. Consider only 
your own views when rating your responses.
1 = Completely disagree; 2 = Somewhat disagree; 3 = Slightly disagree 





1) It is understandable if people resort to terrorism
if it is their only way to be heard.
2) Terrorists must be considered the enemy
of civilized society, regardless of their motives.
3) Only a cowardly group would resort to 
terrorism to achieve its goals.
4) Terrorists would act violent even in 
an ideal society.
5) Terrorism is sometimes morally justified.
6) I’d say many terrorists are courageous people.
7) I’d say the goals of some terrorists have 
been noble ones, such as freedom.
8) There is NEVER justification for violence that
targets civilians.
9) Governments should exterminate known terrorists
without mercy.
10) Insensitive governments share much of the 
blame for the acts of terrorism against them.
11) I’d say there is no difference between “terrorism” 
and “freedom fighting.”
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
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B. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement using the 
following scale:
1 = Completely disagree; 2 = Somewhat disagree; 3 = Slightly disagree 
4 = Slightly agree; 5 = Somewhat agree; 6 = Completely agree
Completely Completely
Disagree Agree
1. I have been kept awake at night worrying about 
being a part of the next big attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 . I am not concerned that the terrorists will attack 
using nuclear or radioactive weapons.
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. I am scared that terrorist may be planning an attack 
near my home.
1 2 3 4 5 6
4. I don't worry about becoming the victim of a 
chemical attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6
5. I am afraid of becoming a victim of a terrorist 
attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 . I never worry that my mail might be contaminated. 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. I worry about being in an area where terrorists may 
use nuclear or radioactive weapons.
1 2 3 4 5 6
8 . I don't worry that terrorists may release biological 
weapons in my area.
1 2 3 4 5 6
9. I do not think that when I travel I am at greater risk 
of terrorism.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0 . I don't worry about terrorism when I travel. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 . When I see a low-flying plane, I worry that it might 
crash.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 . I don't worry about people I know being attacked by 
terrorists.
1 2 3 4 5 6
13. I am afraid for people who fly across the country 
because of the threat of hijacking.
1 2 3 4 5 6
14. I worry about U.S. citizens becoming victims of 
biological terrorist attacks.
1 2 3 4 5 6
15. I don't worry about the mail carriers becoming 
infected with anthrax.
1 2 3 4 5 6
16. I worry about when and where the next big attack 
will take place.
1 2 3 4 5 6
17. I worry about people I know becoming victims of a 
chemical attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6
18. I think it unlikely that I will be the victim of a 
chemical attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6
19. I think it likely that I will be the victim of a nuclear 
or radioactive terrorist attack.
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 0 . I believe that I am likely to be a victim of a terrorist
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attack.
21 .1 think it unlikely that I will be exposed to a 1 2 3 4
biological terrorist attack.
22 .1 believe that I will be the victim of terrorism using 1 2 3 4
conventional weapons.
23 .1 think that people I know are likely victims of 1 2 3 4
contaminated mail.
24 .1 believe that people I know live in areas that are 1 2 3 4
likely terrorist targets.
25 .1 think it unlikely that a friend or relative will be a 1 2 3 4
victim of a chemical attack.
26 .1 think that my friends and family are at risk of 1 2 3 4
terrorism when they travel.
27 .1 think it likely that someone I know will be the 1 2 3 4
victim of a nuclear or radioactive terrorist attack.
28 .1 have taken action to reduce my risk of becoming a ONo 1 Yes
victim of terrorism.
29 .1 fly less because of terrorist hijackings. ONo 1 Yes
30 .1 have a terrorism emergency supply kit. ONo 1 Yes
31.1 have a plan in place in case of terrorist attack. ONo 1 Yes
32.1 have discussed my personal risk of terrorism with ONo 1 Yes
a friend or family member
33 .1 have encouraged others to take steps to stay safe ONo 1 Yes
from terrorism.
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C. Personal Information:
1. In what year were you bom ?___________
2. Where were you bom? (Select one)
1. In the United States; 2. Outside the United States (includes U.S territories)
3. Please indicate you gender below. (Select one)
1. Male 2. Female 3. Transgender
4. Do you consider yourself to be. . . (Select all that apply)
1. African American / 3. Asian/Pacific Islander 5. White/Caucasian
Black
2. American 4. 6 . Other:
Indian/Alaskan Native Chicano/Latino/Hispanic _
5. Are you a citizen of the United States? (Select one)
0. No 1. Yes
6 . If you live in the U.S., what is the location of your legal residence? ____________
7. What is your religious affiliation (if any)?______________________________ _
8 . Do you have non-military family members or close friends who live in a war zone?
0. No 1. Yes
If “Yes,” please explain:
9. Do you have family members or close friends in the military who have been deployed 
overseas in the past year?
0. No 1. Yes
If “Yes,” please explain:
10. Were you, a family member, or a close friend directly affected by a terrorist attack?
0. No 1. Yes
If “Yes,” please explain:
11. How would you judge your political views? (Please circle a number)
Extremely r . Slightly . . .  Slightly _ . Extremely, Liberal . .. , Moderate ,, Conservative „Liberal Liberal Conservative Conservative
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
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12. How interested are you in news stories about homeland security issues? (Please circle 
a number)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not Very interested
interested
13. How interested are you in news stories about national politicsl (Please circle a 
number)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not Very interested
interested
14. How interested are you in news stories about the military? (Please circle a number)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not Very interested
interested
15. In a typical week, how much news do you get from the following sources? (Please
circle a number)
None A little A lot
a. Television 1 2 3 4 5 6
b. Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6
c. Internet 1 2 3 4 5 6
d. Newspaper 1 2 3 4 5 6
e. Other people 1 2 3 4 5 6
16. How often do you watch the TV show 241 (Please circle a number)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Never Rarely Occasionally Often Usually All the time
17. Would you like to offer an explanation for any of your answers on this survey, or 
make any comments?
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APPENDIX E
STIMULI FROM STUDY 4
Bomb Attack Scenario
You wake up in the morning and check the news. The headline shocks you. You 
find out that very early this morning, in Boston, another terrorist attack has occurred. 
Suicide attackers blew up a truck in the 1-93 tunnel underneath the city. Hundreds of cars 
were trapped underneath the rubble, and two office buildings over the tunnel collapsed. 
Authorities are confirming reports that about 350 people are dead, and almost 1500 are 
wounded. At the same time as the attack, a letter was delivered to Boston’s FBI field 
office in which Al-Queda claimed responsibility for the attack.
Bomb Threat Scenario
You wake up in the morning and check the news. The headline shocks you. You 
find out that the FBI’s field office in Boston has received a warning that suicide attackers 
from Al-Queda might blow up a truck in the 1-93 tunnel underneath Boston. Such an 
attack would trap hundreds of cars underneath the rubble, and collapse office buildings 
over the tunnel. Authorities estimate that the attack, if carried out, would kill about 350 
people and wound almost 1500. The FBI states that the letter appears to be a credible 
threat, and should be taken seriously.
Disease Attack Scenario
You wake up in the morning and check the news. You can’t believe what you are 
seeing. Every station is reporting that Al-Queda terrorists have released weaponized 
smallpox into Boston from a crop-duster airplane. Initial estimates are that 500,000 
people have been exposed. FEMA is working with local hospitals to get enough vaccines 
into the city, but panic is starting to break out, along with rioting and looting.
Disease Threat Scenario
You wake up in the morning and check the news. You can’t believe what you are 
seeing. Every station is reporting that they received a threat from Al-Queda terrorists.
The threat is that they will release weaponized smallpox over Boston using a crop-duster. 
Experts estimate that this would expose about 500,000 people. FEMA is working with 
the local hospitals to get enough vaccines into the city. They are also worried about 
rioting and looting if the attack were to set of a panic in the city.
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APPENDIX F
STIMULI FROM STUDY 5
Civilian Targets
1. A conventional might bomb blow up at an indoor shopping mall
2. Gunmen might shoot people at an indoor shopping mall
3. A chemical weapon might be released at an indoor shopping mall
4. A nuclear bomb might be detonated at an indoor shopping mall
5. A biological weapon might be released at an indoor shopping mall
6 . A radioactive “dirty” bomb might be detonated at an indoor shopping mall
Government Targets
7. A conventional bomb might blow up at the Capitol building
8 . Gunmen might shoot people at the Capitol building
9. A chemical weapon might be released at the Capitol building
10. A nuclear bomb might be detonated at the Capitol building
11. A biological weapon might be released at the Capitol building
12. A radioactive “dirty” bomb might be detonated at the Capitol building
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APPENDIX G
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS FROM STUDY 5
1. Please rate the risk for each hazard for the U.S. population as a whole (overall risk) 
l=Slight risk; 7=Extreme risk
2. To what extent is the risk from this hazard “here and now” as opposed to being 
distant in time (immediacy)
1 = “Risk Now”; 7 = “Risk Distant in Time”
3. To what extent are the risks known by the persons exposed to those risks? 
(knowledge)
l=Risk level known; 7=Risk level not known
4. To what extent are the risks known to science? (expert knowledge) 
l=Risk level known; 7=Risk level not known
5. Is this a risk that people dread? (dread) 
l=not dreaded; 7=dreaded
6 . When the risk from this hazard is realized [i.e. if it actually happens], how likely is it 
that the consequences will be severe? (severity of consequences)
l=not at all severe; 7=extremely severe
7. To what extent can scientists and engineers prevent this risk from causing harm? 
(control over risk)
l=little ability to prevent; 7=much ability to prevent
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8 . Is the risk associated with this hazard increasing or decreasing? (increasing) 
l=quickly decreasing; 4=staying the same; 7=quickly increasing
9. To what extent do you believe that you are personally at risk from this hazard? 
(personal exposure)
1=1 am not at risk; 7=1 am very much at risk
10. To what extent does this hazard have the potential to cause catastrophic death and 
destruction across the entire country? (catastrophic potential)
l=low catastrophic potential; 7=high catastrophic potential
11. If this risk were to actually happen, to what extent would those exposed be able to 
control the consequences of that exposure? (control over consequences)
l=low control; 7=much control
12. To what extent is this risk new to society? (newness) 
l=very old risk; 7=very new risk
13. How likely is it that this hazard would actually happen? (likelihood) 
l=extremely unlikely; 7=extremely likely
14. If this hazard were to actually happen, how disruptive would it be to the U.S. 
population? (disruptiveness)
l=not at all disruptive; 7=extremely disruptive
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Study: Terrorism Attack Norming Study 
Approval Date: 03/25/2005
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to  their 
implementation.
The protection of human subjects jn your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.qov/ohrp/humansubiects/quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
/& S-
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
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Study: Categorization and Rating of Possible Terror Incidents 
Approval Date: 10/05/2005
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubiects/quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
For the IRB, ,
Manager 
cc: File
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
Service Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 503-862-3564
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.





Study: Risk Perception and Possible Terror Attacks 
Approval Date: 04/06/2006
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and 
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR 
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your 
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their 
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold 
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the 
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont 
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubiects/quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the 
OSR.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion 
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation 
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please fgel free to 
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
For the IRB,a,
/(el
Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, 
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